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Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s
Abstract
Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and 
securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency.  That position is 
difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and 
institutions.  Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest 
that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of 
economic efficiency.  This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at 
work.  Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—
this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy effect of insider 
trading legislation in the 1980s.  Rather, those laws were motivated primarily by a  desire 
to legitimate the existing political and economic order.  
The policy and doctrinal grounds for prohibiting insider trading are unclear. Yet 
Congress devoted a great amount of attention to increasing the penalties for insider 
trading in the 1980s.  Meanwhile, more serious economic issues went unaddressed.  What 
explains this odd focus?  Congress routinely explains corporate and securities legislation 
as motivated by a need to bolster “investor confidence” and protect the capital formation 
process.  In the 1980s, legislators argued that insider trading scandals were undermining 
investor confidence.  That argument is unconvincing, however, because those scandals
were contemporaneous with unprecedented stock prices.
An alternative explanation for the 1980s legislation is that Congress sought 
political legitimacy: not “investor confidence” in the markets, but “voter confidence” in 
the political-economic system.  Our government has a symbiotic relationship with a 
capitalist system under which the power of business and finance sometimes rivals that of 
the state.  This arrangement is acceptable to most voters during prosperous times, but can 
undermine the legitimacy of the political-economic system in times of perceived 
economic crisis.  Government crafts its responses to such crises to protect its legitimacy.  
The process of self-legitimation does not consist merely of responding to exogenous 
preferences of constituents.  It also includes attempts to mold constituents’ preferences to 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The 1980s were a time of unsettling transition in the American economy.  The 
U.S. economy suffered a severe recession early in the decade.  American manufacturing 
industries went into decline and succumbed to foreign competition.  Hostile takeovers 
changed the face of industry and corporate finance.  Inflation, high interest rates, and 
unemployment created economic uncertainty for a large segment of the public.  The 
subsequent recovery was accompanied by a new deregulatory philosophy in Washington, 
tax cuts for the wealthy and a soaring stock market, which increased real and perceived 
disparities in wealth.  During this time, Congress devoted a significant amount of time to 
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addressing a narrow aspect of securities regulation—insider trading.  Congress passed 
insider trading legislation in both 1984 and 1988.  Between 1986 and 1988, it held four 
sets of hearings specifically devoted to insider trading, and raised the subject in hearings 
devoted to other securities law topics.  Legislators repeatedly suggested that insider 
trading in the 1980s constituted a crisis on par with the stock market crash of 1929.  This 
article asks why Congress was so preoccupied with insider trading.  An important part of 
the answer is Congress’ need to legitimate itself in the eyes of the American public 
during a time of economic uncertainty.  The need for legitimacy is an underexamined 
aspect of Congress’ relationship to Wall Street and the economy, and of Congress’ 
response to real or perceived crises in general. 
American legal scholars tend to subscribe to what Robert Gordon has referred to 
as the “evolutionary-functionalist” account of legal change: “that the natural and proper 
evolution of a society… is towards the type of liberal capitalism seen in the advanced 
Western nations, and that the natural and proper function of a legal system is to facilitate 
such an evolution.”1  Evolutionary-functionalists see this not only as a “natural and 
proper” path, but also as an accurate description of American legal history.  
The neoclassical law-and-economics revolution has championed a specific kind of 
evolutionary functionalism in corporate and securities law.  It holds that legal change 
should be, and for the most part is, a matter of business and economic conditions pushing 
the law in an economically efficient (i.e., liberal and capitalist) direction.  Easterbrook 
1
 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (1984).  As Gordon points out, 
“[t]he words "natural" and "proper" stress the normative nature of the theory; deviations from the norm are 
both atypical and bad.”  Id.
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and Fischel and Roberta Romano advocate especially strong forms of this argument.2
Hansmann and Kraakman, two commentators not associated with the neoclassical camp, 
advanced their own strong version of this argument when they declared that American 
shareholder capitalism represents the “end of history for corporate law.”  American 
corporate law, in their view, has reached a final, perfected form that other countries can 
do little more than imitate.  
Although social science abandoned this kind of normatively loaded story of social 
“progress” long ago, legal scholars, and especially corporate legal scholars, have 
continued to cling to it.3  Some commentators may argue that more, less, or different 
regulation is necessary for optimum efficiency, but most agree to a great extent with the 
descriptive account and implicitly accept the normative account.  Of course, much work 
has been done to pose alternate explanations for legal change.  Mark Roe, for example, 
has argued that “The modern corporation’s origin lies in technology, economics, and 
politics.” 4  According to Roe, American law’s preference for relatively small, 
decentralized shareholders was at least in part a political response to a cultural bias 
against concentrated economic power in general and large financial institutions in 
particular.  Roe argues that populist political ideology and the interests of an important 
constituent group (small financial institutions) coincided, creating enough pressure to 
push Congress to restrict the role of large financial institutions in corporate finance.
2 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
3
 Gordon, supra note -- at 68.
4 MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 




This article also posits a “political” description of developments in securities law.  
But while Roe’s analysis focuses on politicians’ responses to the demands of 
constituents, I focus on a different concern of politicians: institutional self-legitimation—
that is, the legitimation of Congress and of the American government generally, including 
its symbiotic relationship with capitalism.  Any institution must justify its existence and 
the power it wields.  Thus, in addition to pleasing constituents and serving the “public 
interest,” one of the functions of Congress and its members is to legitimate and thereby 
perpetuate itself as an institution.  
Current scholarly commentary pays little attention to legitimation per se.  Most 
legal scholars, as well as many political scientists, view Congress as a frictionless conduit 
for the implementation of its constituents’ demands.5  Some see Congress as a conduit for 
the complex interests of “the public,” while some see it as catering to the wealthy and 
powerful classes,6 or to those constituent subgroups (“special interest groups”) with the 
most organized lobbying or deepest pockets.  In this vein, corporate law scholars tend to 
assume corporate and securities laws are mostly efficient responses to economic 
conditions or, occasionally, the result of rent-seeking machinations by special interests.  
Just as neoclassical corporate-law-and-economics assumes that securities markets 
efficiently express the interests of investors, the view of Congress as conduit assumes 
Congress (the product of political “markets”) efficiently expresses the interests of its 
constituents.  This assumption underemphasizes a phenomenon familiar to the layman: 
5 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON 
THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH (2000).
6 See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); Gordon, 
supra note --, at 74-75.
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legislators’ considerable autonomy.7  Richard Fenno famously characterized legislators as 
rational actors seeking “re-election, influence in the House, and good public policy,” as 
well as “private gain.”8  If legislators are viewed as agents, “good public policy” is in the 
interest of their principals, while energy devoted to the other goals, to the extent that they 
do not contribute to improving policy,9 is a form of agency cost.  Institutional self-
legitimation is one such cost.  While this cost is somewhat mitigated by elections, 
political “markets” are rife with obvious anti-competitive factors: incumbent advantages, 
financial barriers to entry, the party system, districting rules, and so on.
Relying on Congressional hearings, this article reads the story of insider trading 
legislation of the 1980s as an example of the legitimation process.  This Article will 
proceed as follows.  Part II summarizes the two major pieces of 1980s insider trading 
legislation, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.  Part III expands upon this Article’s political 
theory of law.  The recession and the government response to it—deregulation and 
supply-side economics—invited doubts about the capitalist order and the government’s 
role in it.  To defend its legitimacy, Congress attempted to remake the concept of insider 
trading into a symbol of Americans’ pessimism about the economy.10
7 MAYHEW, supra note --, at 12-13
8 RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973). Critics of rational choice theory may argue 
that lawmakers’ motivations are more psychologically complex.  William T. Bianco, Understanding 
Presentation of Self, in CONGRESS ON DISPLAY, CONGRESS AT WORK 217, 217 (William T. Bianco, ed., 
2000).  But in either case, legislators are not mere vehicles of constituent interests.  
9
 Other than private gain these goals can of course serve constituents as well, since re-election and 
influence are necessary to influencing public policy. 
10
 In linguistic terminology, “metonymy” is the figurative representation of one concept with the term for 
another, associated concept. For example, a U.S. Presidential administration is often referred to by the 
related term “the White House.  Thus we might say Congress constructed insider trading as a metonym that 
stood for America’s economic uncertainty.  As we shall see, Congress also contributed to the notion that 
insider trading was a concept associated with American economic problems.  
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Part IV presents evidence from the hearings to support this argument.  In hearings 
on insider trading, many legislators suggested that it was the biggest problem on Wall 
Street.  Congressional Democrats tied insider trading to larger policy issues such as 
hostile takeovers, which they had tried, but failed, to regulate.  Having symbolically 
reduced America’s economic problems to one relatively simple issue, Congress could 
address the issue in a decisive way to show its authority and competence.   Insider trading 
was a particularly useful symbol. First, it allowed Congress to express disapproval of the 
excesses of capitalism without criticizing capitalism per se.  Second, a law-enforcement 
problem like insider trading is concrete and dramatic.11  America’s underlying economic 
problems were hard to identify and explain, and much harder to solve.  Framing the 
economic situation as a law-enforcement issue allowed Congress to portray itself as the 
“good guy” against identifiable “bad guys.”  Moreover, the reframing gave Congress a 
problem that was ostensibly amenable to simple solutions: increased penalties and 
enforcement resources.
II. THE 1980s INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION
In 1982, the SEC proposed legislation that would allow it to seek civil penalties of 
up to three times actual trading profits in insider trading cases.  In 1984, Congress passed 
the treble-damages rule as part of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA).  ITSA also 
increased the maximum criminal fine for Exchange Act violations to $100,000.12 Over 
11
 I use the term “law-enforcement problem” rather than “crime” because insider trading is punishable both 
as a crime and as a civil offense.  As will be seen, the 1980s legislation increased both criminal and civil 
penalties for insider trading.
12
 The maximum penalty had been $10,000 since the passage of the Exchange Act in 1934.  Insider Trading 
Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th 
Cong. 29-30 (1983) (hereinafter H.R. Ser. No. 98-33). 
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the next few years, a number of high-profile insider-trading scandals came to light.  The 
cases—most notably those involving Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken—
suggested that ITSA had been insufficient to deter insider trading.  In response, the House 
held hearings on insider trading in June and July 1986.13  Insider trading became a central 
preoccupation of Congressional hearings on the securities markets for the next few years.
Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
(ITSFEA) in October 1988.  ITSFEA amended the sanctions for insider trading in three 
ways.  First, it extended ITSA’s penalty provisions to “control persons” of an insider 
trader if the control person acted in a “knowing or reckless” manner.14   Second, it 
increased the maximum individual criminal fine under the securities laws (which ITSA 
had recently increased from $10,000 to $100,000) to $1 million and the maximum jail 
term to 10 years.  The fine for “non-natural persons” was increased to $2.5 million.15
Third, it gave parties that trade in a security contemporaneously with the insider trader a 
private cause of action against the insider trader.16
In addition to increasing maximum sanctions, ITSFEA also offered informants a 
“bounty” in the amount of 10% of civil penalties recovered from insider traders 
apprehended on the basis of the informant’s information.  ITSFEA further required 
broker-dealers and investment advisers to establish procedures “reasonably designed…to 
prevent the misuse…of material, nonpublic information.”   The law empowered, but did 
not require, the SEC to establish rules in furtherance of this provision.  ITSFEA also 
13 Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and 
Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d sess. (1986) (hereinafter H.R. Hr. 99-
168).
14
 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 21A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78u-1.
15
 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. 78ff. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 further raised these penalties to $5 million and 20 years for individuals and $25 million for non-
natural persons.
16
 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act § 20A, 15 U.S.C. 78t-1.
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authorized the SEC to conduct investigations in response to a foreign government’s 
request for assistance.  A further provision of ITSFEA directed the SEC to conduct a 
study to update the landmark 1963 “Special Study” of the securities markets.  In addition 
to some very broad instructions about the coverage of the study, this provision 
specifically required attention to insider trading.  Congress did not appropriate the funds 
for the study, however, and it was never conducted.
  ITSFEA also instructed the SEC to make recommendations for new legislation 
regarding its power to impose sanctions for other securities law violations.  The SEC did 
so, and in 1990, Congress enacted many of these recommendations in the Securities 
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (the “Remedies Act”).   The 
Remedies Act specifically authorized federal courts to impose civil penalties on securities 
law violations other than insider trading.  But even after the Remedies Act, the potential 
civil liability for insider trading greatly exceeded, and still exceeds, that for other 
securities law violations.17
Congressional hearings on the legislation served a major research resource for this 
article.  The institutional characteristics of Congress further undermine the “conduit” 
theory of Congressional action described above.  The legislature is a complex 
bureaucratic institution.  Congress (the House in particular) is highly decentralized.  
Much of the political science commentary on Congress focuses on how its diffuse, 
committee-based structure makes it hard to set big-picture policy agendas.   According to 
17
 The Remedies Act expanded the SEC’s penalty power in insider trading cases and other cases by 
authorizing it to issue cease and desist orders and to seek court orders barring violators of §17 and §10(b) 
(which includes insider trading violations) from serving as directors and officers.  Although the Remedies 
Act extended SEC civil monetary penalties to securities law violations other than insider trading, insider 
trading remained the only violation subject to ITSA’s trebling provision and ITSFEA’s “control person” 
liability and $1million maximum fine. (The maximum civil penalty under the Remedies Act was the greater 
of $100,000 or actual gain.)    
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two prominent political scientists, “In large part, the history of the House has been a 
struggle to mold a coherent policy-making instrument out of a large and disparate 
collectivity.  It has been, one might say, a struggle of the general versus the particular, in 
which the particular seems the more powerful force.”18
Congress ostensibly holds hearings to inform the lawmaking process, but they are 
poorly suited for gathering information.19  Legislators’ attendance and attention are 
spotty.  “Witnesses” tend to read from prepared testimony.  Questioning rarely constitutes 
a sophisticated exchange among legislators and witnesses.  Instead, “while one member 
asks questions his colleagues assume an attitude of benign interference.”20  Furthermore, 
although witnesses may present differing views, there is rarely interaction among 
witnesses.  Congressional hearings serve purposes other than information gathering, 
however:
Hearings are public events and serve public purposes.  Even though 
hearings may be poorly attended, they will be studied carefully by 
interested publics and specialized journalists.  Hence, the participants—
legislators no less than witnesses—must pay attention to the impact their 
words will have.  Their purposes include personal advertisement, seeking 
publicity for their views, reminding influential constituents that they are 
on the job, and building a public record in support of a given course of 
action.  A freewheeling, open-ended exchange would not serve these 
purposes as fully as does a more structured performance….21
The 1980s hearings on insider trading and related issues conform to this 
description.  As will be discussed below, legislators placed far more emphasis on 
expressing their preconceived viewpoints than in eliciting information.  Traditional 
analyses of legislative history view legislation as an exercise of realpolitik, public choice, 
18 ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AGAINST ITSELF 19 (1977).
19
 DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note ---, at 82.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 82-83.
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and rational and strategic behavior.  Shortly after the passage of ITSFEA a Congressional 
insider wrote a detailed description of the drafting and passage of ITSFEA.22  That 
account portrayed the legislative process as a series of practical political compromises 
among legislators and regulators with differing opinions on how to solve a common 
policy problem.  That approach illuminates how Congress produced legislation once it 
determined that insider trading was a problem worthy of attention, and that a penalty-
focused response was appropriate.  But it does not ask how Congress made those 
determinations.  It does not examine the role of Congress in constructing the crisis, or the 
legitimating and expressive function of the hearings and legislation. This article addresses 
those issues, focusing on the hearings as rhetorical exercises rather than following the 
evolving drafts as policy compromises.  Admittedly, this approach, too, reveals only one 
aspect of the legislative process, but it is one that is insufficiently explored.
III. LEGISLATION AND LEGITIMATION
1. The Problem: Government and Capitalism
In the United States, as in all capitalist countries, government and capitalism are 
highly interdependent.  This interdependence can create suspicion that the government 
puts the interests of business and the wealthy ahead of the general public.  Thus 
government in a capitalist system must periodically distance itself from capitalism in 
order to maintain its legitimacy and defend itself against charges that it has been 
22
 Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider’s View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988, 45 BUS. LAW. 145 (1989).  Kaswell served as Minority (i.e., Republican) Counsel to the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce.
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captured.23  This is particularly true when average voters are plagued by economic fears, 
as they were in the l970s and 1980s.   To avoid challenging the foundations of the 
economic and political order, however, government must distance itself from capitalism 
without disparaging capitalism per se or wealth per se.  Condemning the excesses of 
capitalism strikes this balance.  It legitimates the government as an independent keeper of 
order and legitimates market capitalism as a system whose unfairnesses are subject to 
occasional corrections by an independent government.24  Thus insider trading was a 
politically useful symbol of America’s complex economic anxieties.  It gave Congress 
the opportunity to condemn capitalism’s excesses, but not capitalism itself.  
American economic uncertainty that began in the 1970s carried on into the 1980s 
due to foreign competition, economic restructuring, and record inflation and 
unemployment rates.  Hostile takeovers drove the stock market upward, enriching a few, 
while many observers (rightly or wrongly) blamed them for layoffs.  Even though many 
economic measures had recovered by the mid-1980s, economic fears lingered well into 
the decade.  Indeed, the unprecedented stock market recovery generated some populist 
resentment, as it preceded the general economic recovery and stock ownership was less 
widely dispersed than it is at present. 
Economic uncertainty shakes public confidence not only in markets, but also in 
the government’s ability to control social conditions—that is, it threatens the legitimacy 
of the government.  Politicians and regulators often speak of building “investor 
23 Cf. TONY POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 137 (1994).  (Arguing that despite the “elite 
power structure,” the government has an interest in prosecuting white collar crime because “the state must 
sometimes make symbolic concessions to non-elites in order to maintain the stability and legitimacy of the 
political system”).
24 Cf . Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The SEC and the 
Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, (2003) (arguing that securities regulation, by 
ostensibly protecting investors from fraud, legitimates both the government and the markets).
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confidence” in the markets and the economy generally.  But the government also must 
maintain “voter confidence” in the government itself.  In times of economic uncertainty, 
when the public questions the fairness of the capitalist system, the state needs a 
legitimating ideology to explain its role vis à vis the financial markets and capitalism 
generally.  Thus, the state periodically mitigates its generally free-market position by 
placing some regulations on the market.  These regulations have consistently 
incorporated a significant degree of so-called “self regulation” by the securities industry.  
Thus the effect of these regulations is not to fundamentally remake the market system, 
but rather to signal the state guarantees the fairness of the market.  This process burnishes 
the reputation of both the market and the state—not to mention the reputations of 
individual politicians.  The most obvious example of this process was the passage of the 
New Deal federal securities laws.  The purpose of this article is not to question the merits 
of insider trading law, our securities regulation regime generally, or the government’s 
good faith in relying upon self regulation.  Rather, I wish to point out that the 
government’s regulatory choices (whatever they may be) are inextricably tied up with the 
legitimation and perpetuation of the government itself. 25
On close examination, the insider trading legislation of the 1980s does not appear 
to be solely, or even primarily, about insider trading.  The insider trading scandals of the 
1980s presented Congress with an opportunity to argue to the American public that 
capitalism is fair—or at least that Congress strives to make it so, and is not controlled by 
the economic elite.  For a government that is closely identified with capitalism and 
25 Cf. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and
September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1629-30 (2002) (“the [Enron] hearings gave members of 
Congress a very public opportunity to attempt to reassert the authority of government and law over 
seemingly corrupt, lawless corporate firms and capital market participants.”).
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sometimes suspected of favoring big business and the wealthy over the general public, 
outlawing and prosecuting insider trading and other so-called “white-collar” crime can 
serve as “a symbolic way of maintaining legitimacy.”26  I do not mean to suggest here 
that economic elites call all the shots in Washington or that capitalism is an inherently 
fraudulent system that can be sustained only by political shenanigans.  The fact is that 
government has an interest in maintaining the legitimacy of capitalism and government’s 
symbiotic relationship with capitalism.27
In addition to the general need to prove it was not captured by business interests, 
the Reagan Administration faced legitimacy concerns specifically related to securities 
regulation and insider trading.  Insider trading scandals emerged with regularity in the 
1980s.  Indeed, Reagan’s first term saw two insider trading scandals involving 
Administration officials.  Thomas Reed, a White House assistant for national security 
affairs, resigned in 1983.  He was later indicted on securities fraud charges.  In 1984, 
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Thayer resigned when the SEC brought insider trading 
charges against him.  Congress passed ITSA that year.  Thayer eventually served 19 
months in prison for perjury and obstruction of justice.  Insider trading thus gained 
political salience and tarnished the legitimacy of the administration.  
Insider trading scandals continued to emerge throughout the decade.  A high-
profile scandal involving Wall Street Journal stock recommendations surfaced in early 
1984.28  The most infamous scandals—those involving Ivan Boesky and Michael 
Milken—occurred after the passage of ITSA in 1984, setting the stage for ITSFEA.   This 
26
 Tony G. Poveda, White-Collar Crime and the Justice Department: The Institutionalization of a Concept, 
17 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE, 235, 237 (1992).
27
 Whether that relationship is a malign conspiracy or a good-faith partnership for the good of society is a 
debate well beyond the scope of this article.
28
 See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 18 (1987).
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may further explain why the Democratically controlled Congress was so interested in 
insider trading.  It may also help explain why the deregulatory Administration and 
Congressional Republicans did not oppose the legislation.  
As insider trading scandals grabbed headlines, some show of government control 
was necessary in order to balance the Reagan Administration’s commitment to economic 
deregulation.29 When Reagan took office in 1980, many expected that the SEC would 
relax securities enforcement.  Reagan’s choice to head the SEC, John Shad, famously 
declared on taking office that he would come down with “hobnail boots” on insider 
traders.  Shad’s strong statement may have been specifically intended to blunt criticism of 
the Administration’s deregulatory philosophy.30  Shad came to the SEC chairmanship 
with directions to deregulate and to reduce enforcement resources.   The Reagan 
transition team recommended reducing the SEC budget by 30% over three years, and 
cutting its Enforcement Division from 200 members to 50.31  The number of SEC staff 
remained the same from Shad’s arrival in 1981 until 1984, and rose by only about 1% in 
1985 and again in 1986.32
The SEC also came under fire for excessive leniency in insider trading cases just 
prior to the passage of ITSA.  When Thomas Reed settled civil insider trading charges 
with the SEC, the settlement was criticized because it required Reed only to disgorge his 
29
 The Enron-era scandals put the government in a similar position, leading to calls for regulation from the 
most unlikely of sources: “Off and on over the years, a few capitalists have done more to delegitimize 
capitalism than America's impotent socialist critics ever did or today's moribund left could hope to. It is the 
Republicans' special responsibility to punish such capitalists.”  George F. Will, …Especially From 
Republicans, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2002, at A19.
30 See Donald Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1273, 1275 (1984).
31 See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation By Enforcement: A Look Ahead At the Next 
Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 201, (1990) (quoting Final Rept. of Transition Team, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) no. 587, at K-1 (Jan 21, 1981)).  The transition team also recommended turning the SEC’s Division 
of Market Regulation into a “think tank” and eliminating the Washington headquarters of the Enforcement 
Division.  Id.
32 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 576 (3d ed. 2003).
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the profits from the disputed transaction.  He paid no penalty and neither admitted nor 
denied guilt.33   Around the same time, a federal district court criticized the SEC for 
seeking similar mild sanctions against an accused insider trader.  The judge called the 
SEC “derelict in its duty.”  “These are thieves we're talking about,” he stated in court.  
“The Government is prosecuting people for stealing Social Security checks out of the 
mail, welfare frauds, and here these people come down and get a slap on the wrist. That 
isn't much in the way of deterrence.”34
2. The Solution: Legislation as Legitimation
Congress responds to economic crises with new legislation because legislating is 
what Congress does, not necessarily because new legislation is an appropriate solution.  
John Coates has argued that new legislation, regardless of its merits, “allows politicians 
to show they can ‘do something,’ while inaction requires politicians to defend a status 
quo tainted in the voting public's mind by the salient fact of market downturn or
scandal.”35 Action is especially attractive, according to Coates, when it is difficult for the 
public to verify whether legislative action will have a positive effect.  
In response to the economic uncertainties of the 1980s, Congress needed to pass 
something.  The root causes of America’s economic problems were far too deep to be 
addressed by piecemeal legislation (and, ironically, the economy was well into recovery 
by the mid-1980s).  As noted, however, Congress is better suited to address the particular
than the general.  Congress nonetheless felt pressure to respond to public anxiety about 
33
  The Senate held hearings to investigate the SEC’s handling of the Reed case.  Senator D’Amato, Chair 
of the Banking Committee’s Subcommittee on Securities, concluded that “the SEC staff acted in a wholly 
professional manner.”  Letter from D’Amato to Rep. Timothy Wirth, April 12, 1983, reprinted in H.R. Ser. 
No. 98-33, at 7 (1983).
34
 Kenneth B. Noble, Insider Cases And the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, January 25, 1983, at D2.
35
 John C. Coates IV, The Privatization of Securities Laws: Private vs. Political Choice of Securities 
Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 568-69 (2001).
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the economy.  Providing a solution to a complex problem necessarily involves framing 
the nature and scope of the problem.  The way in which Congress frames a problem will 
inevitably be influenced by political concerns and practical limitations of Congress.  
There was little Congress could do about major issues such as global competitiveness and 
job security.  Such issues are the stuff of industrial policy that America has traditionally 
left to market forces.  
Congress can enhance the perceived value of its legislative action—and thus its 
legitimating effect—by influencing constituents’ preferences.  That is, Congress may 
reframe a complex, inchoate problem (vague economic uncertainty) as a narrow one it 
can address (insider trading), then set out to address it.  Thus, members of Congress not 
only enjoy autonomy from their constituents’ interests, but also play a hand in shaping 
those interests.  According to the old cliché, if the only tool you have is a hammer, 
everything starts looking like a nail.  In focusing on insider trading, however, Congress 
didn’t just mistake economic problems for law-enforcement problems, but chose to 
reframe economic problems as law-enforcement “nails” that it could more easily solve 
with its legislative “hammer.”  
 Mainstream political science, following mainstream rational choice theory, 
assumes that individual preferences are exogenous.  Yet a growing body of theoretical 
and empirical work suggests that preferences are endogenous.36  Elected representatives 
may play a role in shaping constituents’ preferences in addition to simply aggregating 
36 See Elizabeth Gerber and John Jackson, Endogenous Political Preferences and the Study of Institutions, 
87 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 639 (1993).  Gerber and Jackson present empirical evidence suggesting that 
partisan voters’ preferences with respect to civil rights reform and the Vietnam War changed along with 
shifts in their party’s expressed position on those issues.
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them.37  This type of autonomy is more than an agency cost—it undermines the basic 
assumptions of the traditional principal-agent model.  The multiplicity of varied and 
sometimes conflicting directives from constituents allows—indeed it requires—
politicians to choose from a wide range of policy priorities.  That is, in articulating policy 
justifications, legislators necessarily engage in some degree of constructing the publicly 
accepted justifications, not simply choosing them.38  This is true whether legislators are 
consciously controlling the agenda (for selfish or high-minded purposes) or attempting in 
good faith to coherently serve the incoherent deluge of constituents’ preferences.39    My 
purpose here is to challenge the characterization of Congress as a passive conduit or mere 
agent.  I do not mean to argue that voters are simply passive victims of false 
consciousness.40  Indeed, voters were not necessarily convinced by Congress’s insistence 
that insider trading regulation was a fundamental problem.  Most likely, legislation 
involves a complex combination of politicians acting in self-interest, catering to 
constituent preferences, and influencing those preferences.  
IV.  EVIDENCE FROM THE HEARINGS
37 Cf. id. at 654 (“the role of institutions [e.g., political parties] in developing preferences may be more 
important than their role as aggregator of these preferences”).
38
 See MAYHEW, supra note --, at 18.
It is understandably fashionable to credit “the media” for setting the agenda of public discourse.  
Establishing the extent of this role relative to Washington’s role is beyond the scope of this paper, but some 
speculation on the issue is appropriate here.  Obviously, media fascination with insider trading in the 1980s 
helped make it a prominent issue in the public imagination and thus a salient one for politicians.  But there 
would have been no “insider trading” to report on without a construct of that name—primarily a legal and 
political construct.  Most likely, the media and Congress (as well as prosecutors), each having reasons to 
play up insider trading, acted symbiotically to construct the perception of an epidemic.  
39
 This is reminiscent of the debate in corporate governance over whether directors should owe legal duties 
to multiple constituents, with the goal of maximizing corporate or social welfare generally, or to 
shareholders only, in order to cabin directors’ discretion.
40
 Cf MAYHEW, supra note ---, at 19 (“There is nothing undemocratic or otherwise questionable about such 
voter plasticity; voters would have to be dense not to consider updating their preferences in response to 
relevant moves and events.”)
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1. Constructing the Insider Trading “Epidemic”
Congress ostensibly paid so much attention to insider trading in the 1980s because 
an epidemic of insider trading was in progress.  Most of the legislators demonstrated an 
unwavering conviction that such a problem existed.  But while the anecdotal evidence 
was plentiful, the committees and subcommittees holding the hearings neither requested 
nor received any formal evidence of an insider trading epidemic.  Indeed, Congress 
pressed on despite the fact that the SEC insisted there was no crisis.  Congress largely 
ignored other issues that the SEC identified as more pressing, such as accounting 
reform—an omission which has certainly came back to haunt us.   Congress assumed that 
insider trading was a major problem, both in terms of the rate of incidence and the threat 
it posed to the economy.  Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the insider trading 
hearings is the absence of any testimony (other than bare statements of opinion) or other 
evidence tending to establish either of these points.  Legislators did not receive or even 
ask for any hard evidence.  Rather, they made repeated, unsubstantiated claims of a rising 
incidence of insider trading and the danger it posed to the markets.
It might be argued that it is irrelevant whether an insider trading epidemic was 
actually under way, because even a perception of an epidemic could undermine investor 
confidence and thus justify Congressional action.  Legislators and witnesses claimed that 
recent revelations of insider trading had damaged “investor confidence” in 1987 Senate 
hearings on “Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities 
Industry.”  Senator D’Amato claimed that “The public cannot help but think that the dice 
are loaded… [because of] the recent scandals….If steps aren’t taken to change this 
perception and restore public confidence, the public is going to exit from the market and 
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not come back.”41  Similarly, Donald Marron, Chair & CEO of Paine Webber, argued 
that “Insider trading abuses undermine confidence in our markets and could potentially 
drive foreign investors away.”42  Senator Proxmire was in full agreement with Marron but 
asked for examples or proof.  Marron did not attempt to do so, but merely repeated his 
assertions.  
The hearings generated no evidence that insider trading was harming investor 
confidence, however.  A 1986 poll showed 69% of adults believed that insider trading is 
common.  The percentage was even higher—76%—among adults who invest in the 
markets.43  Despite this perception, the markets were setting records by the middle of the 
decade.  D’Amato himself observed in the 1987 hearing that the stock market was 
“reaching new highs almost daily” and that volatility was being caused by “program 
trading,” not loss of confidence.44  Senator Hecht noted, “We have the highest volume in 
history and so obviously people still have respect for [the securities] industry.”45  The 
strength of the markets in the 1980s contradicts the theory that a perception of 
widespread insider trading was discouraging investment.46  Voters did not seem to think 
insider trading was a major issue in the mid-1980s.  In November 1986, after most of the 
major insider trading scandals of the 1980s had come to light, one survey found only 66% 
of respondents surveyed thought insider trading should be illegal.  Seventy-eight percent 
41 Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Industry:  Before the Subcomm. 
on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 5 (1987) 
(hereinafter S. Hrg. 100-83).  See also Insider Trading:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d sess. 18 
(1988) (hereinafter H.R. Ser. No.100-225)(remarks by Representative Rinaldo); Improper Activities in the 
Securities Industry: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 4, 
7 (1987) (hereinafter S.Hrg. 100-76) (remarks by Senators Shelby and Riegle). 
42
 S. Hrg. 100-83 at 13 (1987). 
43
 Representative Rinaldo cited this poll in a 1986 hearing.  H.R. Ser. No. 99-168, at 2 (1986).  
44
 S. Hrg 100-83 at .
45
  S. Hrg. 100-83 at 7.
46
 Indeed, the belief that there were many successful, undiscovered insider traders may have encouraged 
investment by bolstering the perception that an investor can “beat the market” by amassing information.  
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of respondents thought most people would trade on an inside tip, and over half said they 
would trade on a tip.47
The point here is not to determine empirically whether insider trading justified 
Congressional attention.  Given the difficulty of measuring the incidence of insider 
trading, so we may never know the answer.  This uncertainty underscores the dual role of 
government in the construction, as well as the fulfillment, of political preferences.  When 
the federal government began paying increased attention to insider trading cases, there 
was no doubt some real illegal activity taking place as well as some real public sentiment 
against it.  But the choice to focus on that particular activity was not merely a response to 
illegality or public sentiment.  Prosecutors enjoy a great deal of discretion in choosing 
what cases to bring.48  Congress too has a great deal of “legislative discretion” akin to 
prosecutorial discretion.  On one level Congress was reacting to a crisis, real or imagined, 
partly  constructed by prosecutors.  On another level Congress was actively attempting to 
construct the “insider trading crisis” as a political symbol.
The insider trading hearings support Davidson and Oleszek’s contention that 
Congressional hearings are only nominally geared toward fact finding, and are in fact 
venues for politically-minded performances.49  Legislators seemed more concerned with 
decrying for the record the “problem” of insider trading than with obtaining any 
information about it.  Their pronouncements about the extent and importance of the 
47 See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note --,   at 26 n.325.
48
 Rudolph Giuliani, as U.S. Attorney in New York City, brought most of the famous insider trading 
prosecutions of the mid 1980s.  Fischel argues that Giuliani constructed an insider trading crisis in order to 
advance his political career.  See DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK (1995).  As Fischel notes, many of the 
convictions in those cases were later overturned.
49 See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, quoted supra.
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problem are largely confined to their opening statements.50   To the extent that witnesses 
discussed the matter at all, they tended to dispute the idea of an insider trading epidemic.  
Such testimony does not necessarily disprove the existence of an epidemic. But the 
absence of serious testimony tending to show a widespread problem supports the thesis 
that the hearings did not serve serious fact-finding purposes.  Indeed, the failure to 
request any such testimony suggests the hearings were not even intended to serve such 
purposes.  Politicians had made up their minds to attack the “problem” before the 
hearings and used the hearings to justify that decision.51
Shad was a featured witness at most of the insider trading hearings, but he 
disputed the extent of the alleged insider trading problem.  While Shad portrayed himself 
to the public as an enforcer (for example, with his “hobnail boots” declaration), he urged 
moderation to Congress in the hearings.52  Throughout the ITSA and ITSFEA hearings, 
members of Congress repeatedly invited Shad to join them in declaring an insider trading 
epidemic.  Shad consistently refused to do so.  He may have been motivated in part by a 
desire to protect the markets from additional government regulation.  Or he may have 
50
 For example, Subcommittee Chair Markey opened the final House Hearings on ITSFEA by stating “The 
war against insider trading must be fought on many fronts.”  He also declared that, “During a time when 
Wall Street has been set aflame with fraudulent activity, those of us in public office will not be seen as 
fiddling.” H.R. Ser. No. 100-225, at 2.
51
 Congress did not place emphasis on fact-finding outside of the hearing context, either.  As mentioned 
above, ITSFEA contained a provision directing the SEC to conduct a study of the securities markets.  The 
SEC had presented its last comprehensive study in 1963.  The SEC never conducted the new study, 
however, because ITSFEA had made the study contingent on a subsequent Congressional appropriation of 
$5 million, which never occurred.  Stuart Kaswell, Republican counsel to the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee during the drafting of ITSFEA, states that the Committee did not want the cost of the study to 
cut into SEC enforcement resources.  Kaswell, supra note --, at 179.  But the contingent nature of the 
provision also suggests that Congress was not very concerned with whether the study actually took place, 
or at least that it was more interested in enforcement than in determining whether enforcement was 
necessary.  Kaswell, writing a very favorable assessment of ITSFEA shortly after its enactment, was least 
sanguine about the study provision, expressing skepticism that Congress would ever appropriate the 
funding “in an era of federal deficit reduction.”  Id. at 179.
52
 See next paragraph and the discussion of penalties and enforcement, infra.
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been trying to understate the corruption in the market in order to reassure investors.53  He 
may also have been motivated in part by loyalty to the budget cuts of the early Reagan 
years: until December 1986, Shad did not seek increased funding for enforcement, even 
when the Senate encouraged him to do so.54
Shad did not view enforcement or investor protection as the main goals of the 
SEC.  In the same press conference as the “hobnail boots” comment, he stated that his 
priority upon taking charge of the SEC would be “improving the capital formation 
process.”55  Reflecting on his most important achievements upon leaving office in 1987,
Shad reiterated this theme. He did not even mention enforcement or insider trading.  
Instead, he called integrated disclosure and shelf registration “two of the most important 
improvements in the securities laws since they were enacted in 1933 and 1934.”  These 
developments, he argued, “are saving companies, for the benefit of their shareholders, 
well over a billion dollars a year.”56
Although the SEC had drafted the bill that eventually became ITSA, Shad was 
cool and matter of fact in his testimony.57  He answered questions tersely when asked, 
declining to join the legislators who fulminated at length about the evil of insider trading.  
Shad did not even advocate for the bill which his own agency had advanced.  Indeed, he 
seemed to suggest that private-sector resistance to ITSA was more well-considered than 
53
 Donald Langevoort has argued that while the SEC must point out flaws in the market in order to justify 
its existence, it must at the same time reassure investors in order to keep market participation robust and its 
own regulatory domain large and important.  Langevoort, supra note --.
54 See infra Part IV.4. (“Enforcement Resources”).
55
 Kenneth A. Noble, SEC Chief Plans Insider Trade Curb, N.Y. TIMES, October 26, 1981 at D1.
56
 Nathaniel C. Nash, Shad’s View of 6 Busy Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1987 at D1.
57
 Shad’s restrained position contrast with the legislative proposal the SEC sent to the House in 1982.  The 
proposal identified insider trading as a “serious problem” that “undermines expectations of fairness,” and 
argued that “[t]ougher sanctions are needed.”  H. REP. 98-355, 98th Cong. 2d sess., at 23, 21 (1983) 
reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 2274, 2295, 2293.  A cover letter accompanying the proposal, signed by Shad, 
stated that the proposal represented the views of the Commission.
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the SEC’s own bill.  He said ITSA was drafted by the SEC “staff” and that while the 
Commission approved it, “we did not have a Commission discussion in the kind of detail 
that has been raised by very responsible members of the bar and the securities dealers.”58
During the House hearings on ITSA in 1984, members of Congress tried 
unsuccessfully to get Shad to decry insider trading and its corrosive effect on investor 
confidence.  Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.), Chair of the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, asked Shad whether there might be more insider trading activity 
than the SEC was able to detect.  Shad acknowledged that to be possible, but added with 
implacable logic that for any type of securities law violation, indeed for any type of legal 
violation, “we do not know the cases that we do not identify.”  Dingell pressed on, asking 
whether those undetected cases might affect investors’ returns and undermine “the 
overall confidence of the trading public in the marketplace.”  Again, Shad declined to 
sound the alarm, replying that securities law violations were unlikely to affect the market 
if they were unknown to investors.59 Finally, Dingell sought Shad’s affirmation of the 
following, more restrained assessment: “There are certainly some rogues out there taking 
unfair advantages and behaving…like thieves.”60  Shad agreed at last, but immediately 
qualified Dingell’s mild statement even further: “I would like to put it in perspective…I 
believe that it is a very tiny fraction of the billion of dollars in securities that change 
hands daily.”61
58
 H.R. Ser. No. 98-33 at 53.  
59
 H.R. Ser. No. 98-33 at 65.
60 Id.
61 Id.  Testifying before the Senate on ITSA, Shad’s chief of enforcement, John Fedders, agreed that insider 
trading should not be overemphasized: “The goal right now for the enforcement program is not to target it 
in one area.  Insider trading gets enormous publicity because people can understand it and even people in 
the press can understand it and they can write about it.”  The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983 [sic]: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d sess. 66 (1984) (hereinafter S. Hrg. 98-831).
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Even as the testimony raised doubts about the insider trading epidemic, it 
identified other issues as more important—issues that went unaddressed.  James 
Treadway, then an SEC Commissioner, had recently identified accounting fraud as a 
greater threat to the markets than insider trading.  John Fedders, the SEC’s chief of 
enforcement, agreed with Treadway, and said,
Insider trading has been ballyhooed by the press and made larger than life…Last 
year it consumed only 8 percent of 250-plus cases that we brought—only 20 
cases….there is no way you can compare insider trading as a priority to two other 
areas, that being cooked books…and second, our enforcement program against 
regulated entities, broker dealers, [and] brokerage firms.  Insider trading or any 
other priority that comes about will never replace those two as number one and 
number two because that is the business we are in.62
Despite the opinions of Treadway and Fedders, Congress did not move to address the 
issues of accounting fraud and broker-dealer regulation.63  What explains the success of 
arguably unimportant legislation increasing insider trading penalties, and the failure of 
the arguably more important issue of accounting reform—a failure that came back to 
haunt us in the Enron-WorldCom era?  Recall the simple argument that Congress feels 
pressure to produce results—i.e., legislation—to justify its legitimacy in times of 
economic uncertainty.  Congress may have chosen to address insider trading in part 
because it is relatively easy to produce results in the form of increased penalties.  It may 
have paid less attention to accounting reform because focusing on that complex issue, and 
62
 H.R. Ser. No. 98-33 at 86 (1983).
63
 The House convened hearings on accounting failures in 1985, apparently inspired by the early thrift 
failures that eventually snowballed into the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s.  Interestingly enough, 
however, the hearings focused on accounting in public corporations, not thrifts.  Rep. Ron Wyden proposed 
an accounting reform bill in 1986.  After it failed, he introduced a series of progressively more watered-
down versions in subsequent years.  These proposals yielded nothing until a small provision regarding 
auditor reporting of fraud was included in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10A, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1.  See Thomas L. Riesenberg, Trying to Hear the 
Whistle Blowing: The Widely Misunderstood “Illegal Act” Reporting Requirements of Exchange Act 
Section 10A, 56 BUS. LAW. 1417 (2001); Quinton F. Seamons, Audit Standards and Detection of Fraud 
under the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, 24 SEC. REG. L. J. 259, 260-67 (1996).  
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taking on its powerful, entrenched opponents in the accounting profession, was less likely 
to bear fruit.
Two years after the passage of ITSA, Congress again held hearings on insider 
trading.  The 1986 hearings were apparently motivated by recent revelations of insider 
trading by investment banker Dennis Levine and by  the so-called “Yuppie Five.”  The 
Congressmen praised Shad effusively for his purportedly aggressive fight against insider 
trading.64  But Shad again downplayed the scope of the insider trading problem.  “There 
is too much insider trading,” he conceded, “but it should not be exaggerated out of 
proportion.”65  He argued that
all fraudulent securities activities, including insider trading, amount to a 
fraction of 1 percent of the multibillions of dollars of corporate and 
Government securities that trade daily in America.
It should also be noted that insider trading is but one component of 
the Commission’s enforcement program.66
Asked whether he thought the incidence of insider trading had increased, Shad would 
offer only that, “I think the dollar amount is much greater than it’s been, because the 
dollar amount of everything else that’s going on in the market is so much higher than it’s 
ever been before.”67  According to Shad, the public had an inflated picture of the 
incidence of insider trading because “[w]hat many think is insider trading is more often 
than not legal speculation on rumors and gossip.”68
64
 H.R. Ser. No. 99-168 at 1 (Wirth), 2 (Rinaldo), 3 (Luken).
65 Id. at 12.
66 Id. at 5.
67 Id. at 39.  See also id. at 44: “We are now in the strongest bull market in history.  So the whole 
marketplace has expanded enormously and there is no evidence that this activity has expanded more than 
the rest of the market.”   Shad further states that the increase in tender offers has “given greater visibility, 
greater opportunity for abuse.”  Id. at 44.
68 Id.  See also id at 5.  As Shad’s comment indicates, the disagreement between legislators and witnesses 
over the prevalence of “insider trading” may be partly due to the lack of an agreed-upon definition of the 
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The witnesses’ testimony did not support the legislators’ belief that insider trading
was increasing.  Gordon Macklin, president of NASD, stated merely that insider trading 
“undermines the reasonable expectation that all participants in the securities markets play 
by the same rules.” He said no more about the extent of the problem. John Phelan, head 
of the New York Stock Exchange, went on at length about the corrosive effect of insider 
trading on investor confidence.  But he did not argue that insider trading was on the rise.  
Rather, his testimony focused on describing and defending the NYSE’s internal detection 
programs.  Although he conceded that these measures “may not be a final answer,” he 
argued that, along with ITSA, they “constitute a strong deterrent.”69  Arthur Levitt, then 
the Chairman and CEO of the American Stock Exchange, also refused to join the dire 
chorus about insider trading.  Levitt acknowledged evidence of price movement prior to 
public announcements of takeovers, but argued that it could be caused by legal purchases 
by acquirers, as well as by professional investors who had deduced the likelihood of 
takeovers.70  Thus “one cannot conclude that this activity evidences an epidemic of 
insider trading.”71
Later in 1986, additional hearings were held just after the settlement of the Ivan 
Boesky case.  Representative Ronald Wyden (D-Ore.) asked John Phelan whether 
Boesky’s insider trading was just “the tip of the iceberg” or an “aberration.”72  Phelan 
said he was unable to answer that; Wyden insisted on a response, but Phelan continued to 
demur.  Finally, Phelan allowed that, “based on my 30 years of gut feeling… there has 
term.  Although defining the term would seem a prerequisite to any discussion of insider trading, Congress 
failed to do so.  See section IV.4., infra.
69 Id. at 149.
70 Id. at 182.
71 Id.
72 SEC and Insider Trading:  Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d sess. 158  (1986) (hereinafter H.R. Ser. No. 99-179).  
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got to be more in that area than is out now, and maybe significantly more.” Wyden 
thanked the witness for finally conceding to Wyden’s predetermined conclusion.   “Your 
30 years of gut feeling are certainly helpful and confirms [sic] what I have heard at this 
point.”  But no witness up to that point had argued that insider trading was on the rise.  
Stephen Hammerman, general counsel for Merrill Lynch, testified that he did not believe 
insider trading was widespread proportionate to the size of the industry, or that it was 
growing.  In both hearings, the testimony of the exchanges and securities firms 
downplaying the significance of insider trading obviously had a self-serving element.  
The point, however, is that Congress concluded that insider trading was a significant and 
growing problem even though the hearings adduced no meaningful evidence to that 
effect.  Wyden’s exchange with Phelan epitomizes the fact that legislators had made up 
their minds about the scourge of insider trading and would not let any hearing testimony 
affect their views.
In 1987 hearings on insider trading, Senator Donald Riegle (D-Mich) stated that 
the confirmation of David Ruder as Shad’s successor would hinge upon whether Ruder 
would be as committed as Shad to battling “the contagion of insider trading.”73  Riegle’s 
position is typical of the depiction of insider trading as a fundamental economic issue.  
But Riegle’s suggestion that Shad is a model crusader against insider trading is odd.  
Over and over again in the hearings, Shad refused to join Congress in its claims of an 
insider trading crisis, and he was lukewarm at best with respect to legislative proposals.  
Yet legislators granted him a great deal of deference and even praise. Riegle expressed 
hope that Ruder would “measure up” to Shad with respect to insider trading, and he 
73 Definition of Insider Trading:  Hearings before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Part 1, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 2 (1987) (hereinafter S. Hrg. 100-155 pt.1)
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seems to have gotten his wish: in hearings on ITSFEA, Ruder was as lukewarm as Shad 
had been.  And as with Shad, legislators did not attempt to cast Ruder as the villain, 
despite his opposition to much of the bill.    When asked directly if he supported the bill, 
Ruder replied, “Not all of it.”  The questioner, Representative Howard Nielson (R- Utah), 
then asked if the bill was “salvageable,” to which Ruder unenthusiastically gave a 
somewhat affirmative response.  In Wyden-like fashion, Nielson thanked Ruder and 
declared himself “encouraged” by this answer.74
In April 1987, the Senate held a hearing entitled “Improper Activities in the 
Securities Industry.”  The only witnesses were Gary Lynch, the SEC’s chief of 
enforcement, and Rudolph Giuliani, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York.  The hearing consisted largely of discussion of their recent investigation and 
prosecution of Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky, two of the most notorious insider traders 
of the 1980s.  Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisc.), chair of the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, lauded Lynch and Giuliani as “the Ferdinand Pecoras of the 
1980’s.”75  The comparison is far-fetched to say the least.  Unlike the Pecora hearings, 
which purported to uncover deep patterns of corruption on Wall Street, the insider trading 
prosecutions led only to the punishment of individuals.  Proxmire’s reference to the 
Pecora hearings underscores the fact that none of the 1980s insider trading hearings 
involved documents, investigations, or testimony revealing corrupt practices in the 
securities industry, as the Pecora hearings had.76  Pecora investigated and exposed large,
established companies and banks as corrupt organizations, while Lynch and Giuliani 
74 H.R. Ser. No. 100-225, at 94 (1988).
75 Improper Activities in the Securities Industry:  Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 100th Cong. 2 (1987).
76 See SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 20-38 (describing Pecora Hearings).
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prosecuted individual criminals (including proof readers, clerks, word processors, and the 
like).77  Rather than conducting investigation and fact-finding, the hearings start from the 
presumption that insider trading is a major problem and ask witnesses to agree with that 
opinion and to speculate about its frequency and economic effects.  The hearings on
“Improper Activities in the Securities Industry” congratulate Lynch and Giuliani for their
completed cases and listen to condemnations of Levine and Boesky issued by members 
of the financial establishment with no direct knowledge of the conduct.78
Proxmire framed the purpose of the hearings as follows:  
Some have argued that we should drop all laws that prohibit insider 
trading…They would argue that…the Boeskies and the Levines…deserve every 
penny they can steal.  So you [Lynch and Giuliani] tell us, if you get a chance, 
why we, as Members of the Congress, should be concerned with insider 
trading…and does insider trading, in fact, demean and damage the capital markets 
of our country.79
Proxmire’s suggestion that there was significant opposition to the prohibition on insider 
trading is simply false.80 A few academics questioned the prohibition of insider trading,81
but none of them testified at any of the hearings or enjoyed a prominent place in the 
public debate at the time. No politicians or regulators had suggested any rollback of 
77 See, S. Hrg. 100-76, at 19 (1987) (list of cases brought by S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney’s office).  Giuliani and 
Lynch maintained that they would uncover a large-scale criminal conspiracy thanks to Levine and 
Boesky’s cooperation (negotiated as part of their plea bargains).  No such conspiracy was ever found, 
however.
78
 See testimony of Donald Marron, infra.
79
 S. Hrg. 100-76, at 2 (1987).
80
 Nonetheless, in the final hearings on ITSFEA, Rep. Rinaldo similarly took the opportunity to “disagree 
with those few critics who argue there is no problem with insider trading, that it is really only a victimless 
crime.”  H.R. Ser. No. 100-225, at 18 (1988).
81
 The only critic mentioned by name in the hearings is Professor Henry Manne, who had written a book in 
the 1960s defending insider trading profits as a form of compensation for corporate managers who engineer 
profitable transactions.  HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).  Thus his 
argument would not apply to outside arbitrageurs like “the Boeskies and the Levines.” Other examples of 
academic critiques of insider trading regulation at the time included Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Michael Dooley, Enforcement of 
Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980), but it is not clear whether Proxmire or other 
members of Congress were aware of these works.
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insider trading law.82 As for Proxmire’s question of whether insider trading affects the 
capital markets, this is an empirical issue as to which two law-enforcement officials 
basking in praise for successful insider trading prosecutions are hardly the most qualified 
or impartial sources.  
2. Hostile Takeovers
Why would Congress participate in creating the impression of an insider trading 
epidemic, rather than accepting the SEC’s denials?  America’s multiple, inchoate 
economic uncertainties could not be denied.  Congress needed a relatively simple and 
manageable problem to serve as a proxy for those anxieties and an opportunity for 
Congress to respond to them.  Hostile takeovers were perhaps the most potent symbol of 
the economic woes of the 1980s.  They were, rightly or wrongly, popularly blamed for 
mass layoffs and the loss of American competitiveness.  But they were far more complex 
and politically difficult to address than insider trading.  Furthermore, although hostile 
takeover activity was a major point of populist concern, the Reagan Administration 
supported it the name of free markets and the expected efficiency gains of a “market for 
corporate control.”  In the face of Republican opposition, Democrats’ attempts to regulate 
hostile takeovers failed.  Insider trading, however, had no defenders.  In the insider 
trading hearings, members of Congress (mainly Democrats) repeatedly overstated and 
distorted the connection between insider trading and hostile takeovers.  In so doing they 
may have been attempting to portray insider trading legislation as a substitute for hostile 
takeover regulation, which they were unable to pass into law.  
82
 In later Senate hearings, Sen. Armstrong, in passing, mentioned Manne’s position as worth consideration, 
though he called it “far-fetched.”  S. Hrg. 100-83, (1987).
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An obvious irony of politics is that it is easier to reach agreement when less is at 
stake.  A focused campaign against an easy target, insider trading, provided an
opportunity for both parties to express concern about economic issues and to show its 
effectiveness by producing a legislative response. Insider trading regulation was probably 
more palatable to Republicans than hostile takeover regulation because it did not threaten 
arguably productive business practices.  On the other hand, Democrats portrayed it as a 
substitute for their failure to pass hostile takeover regulation.  In the hearings, Democratic 
members of Congress repeatedly conflate insider trading with hostile takeovers.  They 
appear to have been suggesting to constituents that insider trading laws would impede 
hostile takeovers despite the failure of attempts to pass actual takeover regulation.
In the 1980s, there was a great deal of public anxiety about hostile takeovers.  
Hostile takeovers were upsetting to labor, the economic establishment, and members of 
the public who envied wealth.83  Hostile takeovers were, rightly or wrongly, identified 
with mass layoffs, and thus came to symbolize the economic uncertainty of the 1980s.84
Although major economic indicators suggest that the recession had ended by the mid-
1980s, hostile takeovers remained a major political concern throughout the decade.85
83 FISCHEL, supra note --.
84
 Like hostile-takeover legislation, Congress had difficulty passing legislative protection against layoffs.  
The 100th Congress passed plant-closing legislation (WARN) on August 4, 1988, some 14 years after the 
first plant-closing bill was introduced.  See Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis of the 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act in Practice, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1 (1993).   Its primary provision was a requirement of advance notice of plant closings.  It did not otherwise 
limit closings or provide for compensation to workers.  WARN created private causes of action for workers 
against employers who violated the notice requirement, but did not provide for government enforcement of 
the requirement.  See id.
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 For example, despite Congressional failure to do so, states enacted anti-takeover legislation throughout 
the 1980s and even into the 1990s.  See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover 
Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 850 (1989) (Delaware, the leading corporate law jurisdiction, passed an 
antitakeover “business combinations” statute in 1988); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting 
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Insider trading and takeovers were linked in the public imagination.  Business 
Week’s cover story of April 29, 1985, was titled Insider Trading: The Wall Street 
Epidemic Washington Can’t Stop.  Business Week conducted a study of 229 takeover 
attempts and found that in 72 percent of the cases, target company prices rose before a 
bid was publicly announced.  Prominent insider traders, such as Dennis Levine, Ivan 
Boesky, and the “Yuppie Five,” were convicted for trading on nonpublic information 
regarding hostile acquisitions.86
The hostile takeover wave of the 1980s has been criticized for destroying 
American businesses and jobs, and defended as part of a salutary streamlining of bloated 
American industry.  This article takes no position on this issue.  Justified or not, there 
was strong anti-takeover sentiment in the popular imagination, from organized labor,87
and from the financial and industrial establishment.88  The Reagan White House and the 
SEC, however, were “ideologically committed to fostering a market for corporate 
control.”89  Democrats in Congress tried, and failed, to pass legislation restricting hostile 
takeovers.  In the insider trading hearings, politicians consistently conflated takeovers 
and insider trading in an apparent attempt to suggest that, by passing laws punishing 
insider trading, they were striking a blow against hostile takeovers.  
Hostile acquirers and many academic commentators justified the hostile takeover 
movement in large part with the argument that it would unlock shareholder value.  This 
86
 Note that the opportunities for profitable insider trading in a hot M&A market are not limited to hostile 
takeovers.  In 1987 Senate hearings, US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani submitted a list of what appear to be 
insider trades, or suspected insider trades, by Levine, Boesky, Martin Siegel, Ilan Reich, and Marcel Katz. 
The vast majority of them involved friendly takeovers, not hostile ones.  S. Hrg. 100-76, at ---.
87 See testimony of Lawrence Gold, General Counsel, AFL-CIO, S. Hrg. 100-183 at ---.
88 See testimony of Donald Marron, Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeovers:  Hearing on S. 227, S. 678, 
S. 1264, S. 1323, and S. 1324 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 
1st sess. -- (1987) (hereinafter S. Hrg. 100-183).
89
 Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information: A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 131(1998)
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approach explicitly placed stock prices ahead of employee welfare and other measures of 
a corporation’s social utility. Both the normative argument that privileged shareholder 
value and the descriptive argument that hostile takeovers served that norm were 
extremely controversial at the time. The public and many politicians in the 1980s tended 
to dismiss the focus on share price as an immoral or disingenuous justification for the 
greed of “corporate raiders.”  Even John Shad voiced this same skepticism in a June 1984 
speech calling for takeover regulation.  Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, however, soon 
stated the White House’s opposition to regulation and argued for the beneficial economic 
functions of takeovers.  Shad did not revisit the issue. 
Both parties felt political pressure to respond to hostile takeovers.  The Tender 
Offer Report Act was introduced in the House in 1984.  Senator Proxmire introduced the 
Corporate Productivity Act in 1985, requiring that all takeover attempts be done by 
tender offers submitted to the target’s board of directors.  Multiple takeover regulation 
bills were introduced in the Senate in 1987.  Rather than adopting Secretary Regan’s 
strong pro-takeover position, Congressional Republicans introduced their own version of 
tender-offer reform.90  The GOP bill also included some measures designed to fight 
insider trading.91  Neither the securities industry nor the SEC supported either party’s 
90
 H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 3 Cong. Rec. H4558 (1987).  Of course, the introduction of a 
competing bill could also have been a strategic move designed to derail the passage of legislation.
91
 These provisions included SEC funding increases as requested by the Commission and SEC coordination 
with foreign securities enforcement investigations.  See Kaswell, supra, note 24 at 148.  Both were passed 
as part of separate legislation, the latter as part of ITSFEA.  A controversial provision would have 
empowered the SEC to require internal surveillance systems of broker-dealers and self-regulatory 
organizations (“SROs,” i.e., the exchanges and NASDAQ).  This provision met with significant resistance 
from the industry and the SROs.  Id. at 149.  The bill also included instructions to the SEC to conduct a 
comprehensive study of the securities markets, see id., which also found its way into ITSFEA. 
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proposals, and the parties could not come to agreement on a compromise bill.92  None of 
the proposed takeover regulation bills passed.93
Although the parties could not agree on hostile takeover legislation, they could 
agree that insider trading was undesirable.  Furthermore, tender offer reform lacked the 
support of the SEC and the White House.  Accordingly, the Administration had 
apparently chosen to respond to the excesses of the hostile takeover market indirectly 
through insider-trading prosecutions of prominent takeover artists like Milken and 
Boesky rather than through tender offer regulation.94  Thus insider-trading laws, 
particularly ITSFEA in 1988, may have been in part a compromise attempt between 
Democrats and Republicans to suggest that they were taking some economic action in 
response to hostile takeovers.  This tail came to wag the dog: after the failure of anti-
takeover legislation in 1987,  Congress passed ITSFEA, insider trading legislation more 
extensive than that included in the GOP’s anti- takeover bill.  
In the 1980s hearings, many Democrats insisted that insider trading and takeovers 
were “related,” but they never established precisely what that relationship was.  The
conflation raises questions about the extent to which insider trading was the true concern 
of Congress.  The evidence suggests that the insider trading hearings and legislation were 
at least in part an expression of displaced anti-takeover sentiment.  Indeed, the Senators 
who conflated hostile takeovers with insider trading in hearings on insider trading barely 
92 See Kaswell, supra note --- at 147-150.
93
 Fischel credits the 1987 crash with finally ending attempts at federal anti-takeover legislation.   Some 
observers feared a coming 1929-style crash, and some blamed the specter of antitakeover legislation for the 
crash.  Congress lost its stomach for regulation for fear of catching blame for harming financial markets 




mentioned insider trading in the hearings on anti-takeover bills in 1987.95  Instead, they 
focused on the arguments that hostile takeovers destroy healthy companies and cost jobs.
As with the question of the insider trading “epidemic,”  Congress did not seek 
evidence of a link between hostile takeovers and insider trading.  And, as with the 
“epidemic” question, Congress ignored the conflicting views of John Shad.  In 1983 
hearings on ITSA, Shad did not criticize hostile takeovers or directly blame them for 
insider trading.  He did note, however, that hostile takeovers provide especially profitable 
opportunities for insider trading,96 especially with the growth of standardized option 
contracts.97  After Treasury Secretary Regan expressed the White House’s support for an 
active corporate control market, Shad told the Senate in 1985 that takeovers were good 
for the economy because they tended to increase market capitalization.98  He also 
expressed faith in the market to judge the value of  junk bonds, which were often used to 
finance takeovers and thus considered part of the perceived takeover problem.
Although prices often spike prior to takeover announcements, Shad argued that 
these price increases are “often” the result of legal purchases by prospective acquirers 
themselves and other parties with legally acquired information.99  According to Shad, 
95 See S. Hrg. 100-183..
96
 In a written statement included in the hearing record, Shad wrote: “The large number of mergers and 
tender offers has been an important factor in the increased incidence of insider trading because the reaction 
of the market to the announcement is predictable…Thus, persons with advance knowledge of a proposed 
tender offer or merger announcement have an opportunity to obtain substantial profits in a short period of 
time without great risk of loss.” See H.R. Hrg 99-33 at 19.  
John Phelan, head of the NYSE, offered a similar explanation in 1986 hearings.  H.R. Ser. No. 99-
179 at 164.  
97
  In his written statement, Shad pointed out that standardized option contracts reduced the capital one had 
to put at risk in order to trade on inside information, because buying options is cheaper than buying the 
underlying stock; furthermore, “once a tender offer or merger is announced, the value of an option contract 
tends to increase at a much greater percentage than the rise in the price of the stock.” HR Hrg 99-33 at 20.
98Reauthorizations for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1986-88:  Hearing on S. 919 Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st sess. 45-
46 (1985) (hereinafter S. Hrg. 99-129).
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 H.R. Ser. No. 99-168 at 11, 39.  
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it is not difficult for securities analysts, risk arbitrageurs, speculators and a 
wide variety of others to identify probable takeover candidates….If you 
wanted my opinion, I believe that the legitimate reasons, plus rumors and 
speculations that the market has always had in enormous quantity, far 
exceed the amount of insider trading prior to public announcement.100
The House held hearings on insider trading in December 1986.  The Levine case 
had settled that spring, and the Boesky case had just settled.  In the meantime, the SEC
and Justice Department continued to investigate Michael Milken, who had close 
professional ties to Boesky and whose junk-bond empire dominated the  financing of 
hostile takeovers.  These individuals, like so many of the prominent insider traders of the 
1980s, were convicted or suspected of trading on information about takeovers.  Thus they 
intensified the popular association of insider trading with hostile takeovers.  
Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio) was clearly in the minority when he argued in 
vain that “these are two distinct issues.  I trust we will reserve our other hearings to 
examine the tender offer problem.”101  Instead, the insider trading hearings became a 
forum for criticizing hostile takeovers.
As Shad pointed out, the hostile takeover wave created unprecedented 
opportunities to make immense profits by trading on nonpublic information.  But many 
members of Congress reversed the relationship, suggesting that insider trading causes 
takeovers.  Representative Wyden asked, “Would the whole phenomenon of what Mr. 
Boesky so poetically calls ‘merger mania’ have gathered steam without widespread use 
of insider trading?  It seems very, very unlikely.”102  Similarly, Representative Florio (D-
100 Id.
101 H.R. Ser. No. 99-179 at 6. Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) said essentially the same thing in 1987 hearings, 
and was similarly ignored, in S. Hrg. 100-76, at 9.
102
 H.R. Ser. No. 99-179 at 5.
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N.J.) stated, “The insider trading scandal has…raised some significant questions 
about…what in fact is the driving force behind [hostile] takeovers.” 103  This reverse 
theory—that insider trading is indispensable to takeovers—makes little sense.  Indeed, 
trading on leaked information about a planned takeover bid can trigger an increase in the 
target’s price, thus discouraging the acquisition.104
In 1986 hearings on SEC funding, Representative Dingell asked Shad to tell the 
panel:
what will be the level of enforcement that you will need to properly deal 
with not only the insider trading questions, but the other related questions 
of takeovers and mergers…because it appears very much to the Chair that 
these are related matters and may perhaps be simply different portions of 
the same apple.105
By implying that takeovers could be regulated by stepping up securities law enforcement, 
this statement diverted attention from Congress’s failure to pass anti-takeover legislation.  
Furthermore, it shifted responsibility from Congress to the SEC.  Moreover, Dingell 
referred to hostile takeovers as “related” to insider trading, thus suggesting that 
Congressional success in producing insider trading legislation constituted a blow against 
insider trading.  Dingell did not, however, explain how takeovers and insider trading were 
“related.”  
The Senate’s 1987 hearings on “Improper Activities in the Securities Industry”  
were focused on the recent stock-fraud convictions of Ivan Boesky and Dennis Levine by 
Giuliani and Lynch.  Nonetheless, senators introduced the hearings by discussing hostile 
103
 H.R. Ser. No. 99-179 at 9.  
104
 It is conceivable (though unlikely, given the costs and risks involved) that a takeover bid could be a 
bluff designed to drive up the target’s share price and create the opportunity for secret trading profits.  But 
this fanciful scenario only makes sense if no takeover were ever intended, and thus it lends no support to 
the theory that insider trading is intimately linked to takeovers.




takeovers, characterizing them as an example of “improper activities.”   Furthermore, 
they implied the reverse theory of causation espoused by Wyden and Florio in the 1986 
House hearings.  Senator Proxmire asked rhetorically, 
How much do we really know about the corporate takeover game and the 
complex network of information that circulates among investment bankers, 
takeover lawyers, corporate raiders, arbitrageurs, stock brokers, junk bond 
investors and public relations specialists?  Is insider trading central to the takeover 
process, or is it merely an isolated abuse?106
Senator Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.) suggested that takeover bids were announced in order to 
create the “opportunity” for insider trading.107 Senator Heinz (R- Pa.) stated,  “I am most 
interested in what our witnesses have to say, because what this committee needs to do is 
determine whether there is something inherently corrupting in the merger game and the 
way it is played.”108 The only witnesses at the hearing, however, were Giuliani and 
Lynch, enforcement officials unlikely to be qualified to evaluate “the merger game” as a 
whole.  
Heinz indicated that his real concern was takeovers per se, not their relationship 
to insider trading:  
…the fast bucks are being made at the expense, I fear, of America’s 
competitiveness, because every fast buck used in a takeover battle, ending up as 
debt on a balance sheet of an acquirer, is a buck that cannot go into research or 
development or long-term planning or productivity enhancement.109
This is a plausible hypothesis about takeovers, and potentially a good policy justification 
for their regulation.  But of course, it has nothing to do with insider trading, or the 
hearings at hand.  The hearings did not discuss whether the takeover wave had resulted in 
a misallocation of resources, or whether insider trading had anything to do with it.  As 
106
 S. Hrg. 100-76 at 1.  
107 Id. at 11-12.
108 Id. at 2.  
109 Id. at 3.  
LEGISLATION AND LEGITIMATION
39
with the general nature of “the merger game,” the macroeconomic consequences of 
takeovers were far beyond the expertise of Giuliani and Lynch.
The Senators’ phrasing and their subsequent statements in the hearing show that 
they sought testimony not for information, but for confirmation of their preexisting 
positions.  Indeed, despite the senators’ opening statements, very little of the questioning 
concerned the relationship between takeovers and insider trading—about 3 pages of 80 
total pages of testimony and questioning.110  This limited discussion addressed only the 
uncontroversial fact that impending takeovers (not just hostile ones) create the 
opportunity to make unusually large amounts of money from inside information.  It did 
not explore the implausible theory that insider trading causes hostile takeovers.  Indeed, 
despite the repeated, unsupported statements of representatives and senators, none of the 
hearings include any evidence supporting this idea.
The Senate held hearings in February 1987 on “Oversight of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Securities Industry.” Although the hearings were about 
the SEC generally and not insider trading in particular, insider trading and hostile 
takeovers predictably emerged as a prominent topic.  Senator Sasser called for 
“legislation that shines the light on the stock manipulations that are at the heart of 
corporate takeovers today.”111  Donald Marron, Chair & CEO of Paine Webber Group, 
testified that government action was necessary to prevent “the loss of public confidence” 
caused by insider trading.112  He supported increasing the flow of information to the 
market, for example, by requiring earlier disclosure of the acquisition of large blocks of a 
110 Id. at 72, 76-77. 
111 S. Hrg. 100-83 at 6.  
112 Id. at 12.   “I reluctantly conclude that Wall Street cannot solve this problem alone,” Marron stated.  Id.
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stock113 and of trades in a stock by the issuing corporation’s directors, officers and major 
shareholders.114 In supporting enhanced disclosure, Marron seemed , unsurprisingly,
more concerned with impeding takeovers, not with limiting insider trading based on 
takeover information.  This is particularly evident in the following statement:
Attempts should be made to achieve more balanced rules between target 
companies and buyers to help reduce the abuses that are being experienced 
in [tender offers].  For example, more diligent consideration should be 
given to the elimination of so-called greenmail and to the creation of rules 
that would require the full financing of tender offers before they 
happen.115
The “full financing” proposal has no apparent connection to insider trading.  Rather, it 
appears to be aimed at Michael Milken’s aggressive method of financing takeovers by 
relatively small acquirers.  Commercial and investment banks were loath to finance 
hostile takeovers.  Drexel, however, would give unfunded tender offers credibility by 
publicly stating that it was “highly confident” it could raise the funding, then quickly do 
so by selling junk bonds.116 Marron’s testimony seems to express the financial 
establishment’s desire to protect its clients in the corporate establishment from hostile 
takeovers.
Congress considered, but ultimately rejected, a direct and potentially effective 
method of combating trading based on nonpublic information about takeovers: 13(d) 
reform.  Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act gives the acquirer of 5 percent or more of a 
stock 10 days to file notice of that fact with the issuer, the exchanges, and the SEC.   The 
113
 Such disclosure is governed by section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
78m(d).  13(d) reform is discussed in detail infra.  Marron also suggested broadening the reach of 13(d) to 
include not only groups that explicitly agree to obtain 5% or more of and issue, but also “tacit 
understandings” concerning “concerted or coordinated activities relating to significant acquisitions of stock 
in publicly held companies.”
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 S. Hrg. 100-83 at 12.   Such disclosure is governed by section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78p(a).
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 S. Hrg. 100-83 at 14.
116 See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 114-115 (1991).
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opportunity to trade on significant nonpublic information arises during that 10-day 
“window.”  Requiring earlier disclosure of large positions would limit such opportunities, 
while avoiding the legislative difficulties involved in creating a new class of proscribed 
conduct.117
Since the SEC supported 13(d) reform, it could likely have been passed had it 
been proposed by itself or linked to ITSFEA.  But it appears that Congress pursued 13(d) 
reform as a device for regulating takeovers, not for preventing insider trading.  Closing 
the 10-day window could derail takeovers because early disclosure would raise 
acquisition prices and encourage the issuer to institute takeover defenses.  13(d) reform 
came before Congress as part of a package of hostile takeover regulation, and when 
hostile takeover regulation failed, 13(d) reform failed with it.  This framing of 13(d) 
reform is consistent with the argument advanced above that Congress was more 
concerned with takeovers than with insider trading in connection with takeovers.  
Indeed, it was well within Congress’s power to directly prohibit trading on 
material information about hostile takeovers, yet it declined to do so.  The SEC passed 
such a rule, Rule 14e-3, in 1980.  However, the Commission’s statutory authority to pass 
such a rule was, and remains, unclear.118  Nonetheless, Congress did not (and still has 
not) acted to codify the prohibition.  This further supports the theory that Congress was 
more concerned about hostile takeovers per se than insider trading on hostile takeover 
information.  Conversely, the SEC, which openly favored an active takeover market, was 
117
 As noted above and further discussed below in section IV.4.a. below, securities law did not (and still 
does not) clearly define what constitutes illegal “insider trading.”  As long as this remains the case, 
eliminating opportunities to trade on nonpublic information would seem to be more effective than 
increasing penalties.  
118
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decide whether the SEC had statutory authority to prohibit under 14e-3 insider trading not already 




more interested in regulating misconduct in connection with takeovers than in restricting 
takeovers per se.
  In 1980, SEC Chair Harold Williams proposed closing the 13(d) window, 
apparently to discourage hostile takeovers.119  In 1983, his successor, John Shad, 
appointed an Advisory Committee on Tender Offers.  The committee stated that it could 
not be determined whether hostile takeovers were beneficial or harmful to the economy, 
and recommended a mild reform package that included closing the 13(d) window.120  The
proposed Tender Offer Report Act, reported by the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee in 1984, would have closed the window, but would have also placed further 
requirements on bidders. For example, the bill would have increased the length of time 
tender offers were required to remain open, and bidders would have to file an impact 
statement.  The Reagan administration and the SEC saw the bill as too restrictive and 
opposed it.  Hearings on takeover regulation were held in the 99th and 100th Congresses, 
but they produced no legislation.
The SEC continued to support 13(d) reform in 1987, when Congress once again 
considered takeover regulation.121  But as in 1984, 13(d) reform was coupled with 
additional takeover restrictions that alienated the SEC and the White House and doomed 
the entire package.  The takeover bills considered by Congress in 1987 would have, in 
slightly different ways, closed or narrowed the 13(d) window, increased required 
119
 The historical information in this paragraph is derived from Karmel, supra note --, at 128-29.
120
 FISCHEL, supra note --, at 37.
121
 Karmel, supra note --, at 129.  In 1987, the SEC supported a narrowing of the window from ten days to 
five: “The SEC's rationale for this proposal was that it would promote prompt disclosure without unduly 
inhibiting the ability of market participants to trade freely. There was no mention of curbing insider trading 
in the tender offer arena.” Id.  
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disclosure re tender offers, and increased the  minimum period of time tender offers were 
required to remain open from 20 days  to periods ranging from 30 to 60 days.122
3. Moralism, Envy and “New Money”
The choice of insider trading as a symbol translated economic issues into a moral 
conflict in which the government clearly held the high ground.   With its crusade against 
insider trading, Congress expressed moral disapproval of certain business figures without 
raising questions about capitalism itself or the government’s interdependent relationship 
with it. It was no accident that Congress presented wealthy and powerful individuals as 
the “bad guys” in insider trading.  Many scholars have argued that financial regulation, 
and insider trading regulation in particular, are at least partly motivated by populist 
resentment of the wealthy.123  Most of these commentators view Congress as responding 
(if not pandering) to constituents’ own prejudices.  But the need to criticize the excesses 
of capitalism means politicians also have a self-interested motivation to “blame the rich.”  
Mark Roe has argued that the development of the U.S. financial regulatory regime 
has been heavily influenced by a culturally embedded suspicion of concentrated 
economic power. 124  This hostility wanes in good economic times, but resurfaces in 
recessions and depressions.  According to Roe, the corporate and financial establishment 
of the 1930s accepted disclosure regulation as the “lesser of the political evils” at a time 
122 These bills, S. 227, S. 678, S. 1323, and S. 1324 (100th Cong., 1st sess.), are reprinted and discussed in 
S. Hrg. 100-183.
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when many people were clamoring for direct government regulation of business and 
socialism was a real political force.    
Daniel Fischel has argued that the popular view of the 1980s as the “decade of 
greed” is an expression of populist envy of the rich.  Further, he has vociferously argued 
that that envy fueled the high- profile prosecutions of Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky.125
According to Fischel, hostility toward business and finance arises not only from bad 
economic times for average people, but also from extremely prosperous times for the 
rich.  Despite the “trickle-down” rhetoric of the 1980s and the eventual economic 
recovery, the majority of the public was excluded from the great wealth of the stock 
market boom.  Junk bonds, LBOs, and other arcane opportunities for great wealth were 
accessible only to privileged insiders.126  Although the Supreme Court has rejected the 
idea, the prohibition on insider trading has—historically and in the popular imagination—
gained support from the perception that unequal access to information about the markets 
is unfair.  Such informational disparities correspond to “inequalities in wealth…and 
access to human capital in society at large.”127  Jeanne Schroeder has gone so far as to 
argue that the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading liability can only be explained 
as an expression of envy of those who enjoy trading advantages over the general 
public.128
125 FISCHEL, supra note --, at 1-8.
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 Even among institutional investors, dowdier players like S&Ls did not get into the junk-bond market 
until it was on the verge of collapse.
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 Jeanne L. Schroeder,  Envy and Outsider Trading:  The Case of Martha Stewart, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 
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ITSA and ITSFEA were part of a larger legal preoccupation with insider trading 
that included increased prosecutorial action.  The rise of insider trading prosecutions may 
have been due to changing prosecutorial priorities as much as to changing patterns of 
criminal behavior.  Tony Poveda has argued that the government concern with white-
collar crime in the 1970s was a broad-based, decentralized response to the 
delegitimization of government authority following the Watergate scandal.129  In the 
immediate post-Watergate era, the Justice Department and the FBI specifically stated 
numerous times that they focused their efforts on white-collar crime in order to restore 
confidence in the justice system and the government.130   Poveda notes that the FBI’s 
annual report first began including “white-collar crime” as a subheading in 1974.  The 
first-ever criminal prosecution for insider trading under 10b-5 was brought in 1978,131
and a wave of major prosecutions continued throughout the 1980s.  Poveda’s theory is 
also consistent with the SEC’s controversial move in the 1970s, under Commissioner 
Stanley Sporkin, to take on corporate corruption in addition to its more typically 
“regulatory” tasks.  
Disparity in wealth is endemic to American society, indeed to most societies 
today.   By itself, then, the envy argument is an incomplete explanation because it fails to 
explain why this populist sentiment resulted in insider trading legislation and not other 
legislative changes, such as progressive taxation.  Part of the answer is that insider 
trading offered Congress an opportunity to cater to the popular envy of wealth without 
actually challenging the established economic order.   The legitimacy of Democratic 
129 TONY G. POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1994).
130 Id .at 136-37.
131




members of Congress required establishing populist credentials without inflaming too 
much resistance from the economic establishment.  Republicans, conversely, had to show 
that their new deregulatory, pro-business approach would not include a free pass for 
abusive practices.   Insider trading regulation pleased populists by addressing the 
excesses of a small set of wealthy individuals.  At the same time, it pleased the Wall 
Street establishment because it posed no fundamental challenge to the status quo.
Even the high-profile, highly privileged insider trader villains of the 1980s, bond 
traders like Michael Milken, arbitrageurs like Ivan Boesky, and investment bankers like 
Dennis Levine, came from relatively less privileged roots than the leaders of established 
financial houses and corporations.  Indeed, although Fischel blames insider trading 
prosecutions on a populist bias against wealth per se, he further contends that the hostile 
takeover battles of the 1980s were at least in a part “a struggle between old money and 
new money.”132  Milken and Boesky, he argues, made their fortunes by attacking the 
economic status quo—which included organized labor as well as established financial 
houses and industrial corporations.133  Fischel contends that Milken was the victim of an 
“unholy alliance” between the “displaced establishment” and the aforementioned leftist 
“rich-haters.”134  While there is no real evidence of any overt conspiracy,135 the 
aforementioned conflation of insider trading with hostile takeovers in the Congressional 
hearings is consistent with this theory.  Portraying insider trading regulation as anti-
132
 FISCHEL, supra note 43, at 22.
133 Id. at 68, 189. Fischel introduces his book by condemning those who vilify the rich, but here he 
distinguishes between “old” and “new” money and vilifies the former.
134 Id. at 168. 
135 See Thomas Smith, The Passion of Professor Fischel: Defending Milken's Financial Revolution, 22 
Law & Soc. Inquiry 1041, (1997) (review of Payback).  As Smith points out, Payback’s often trenchant 
critique of the Congressional response to hostile takeovers and  insider trading is to some degree 
undermined by Fischel’s own “angry energy” and “lack of objectivity.” Id.
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takeover legislation appealed to the Wall Street establishment as well as to populist 
sentiment.136
In fact, insider trading regulation cannot be sincerely portrayed as a populist blow 
against the wealthy.  Like the “white collar crime” movement generally, the insider 
trading crusades may have resulted in punishments of “average people” more often than 
powerful elites.137  The legislative reforms arguably did little to hold elites responsible.138
And although a number of high-profile prosecutions involved wealthy traders, many low-
level individuals were prosecuted as well.  Rudolph Giuliani, as U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York, brought a large number of insider trading prosecutions 
against clerical workers.139  Similarly, the SEC under Shad pursued a “small dollar 
program” involving small gains, sometimes less than $10,000.140  Furthermore, John 
Fedders, the SEC’s chief of enforcement under Shad, specifically said he thought upper-
136
 See especially the testimony of Paine Webber executive Donald Marron in S. Hrg. 100-83, discussed 
supra.
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believe that much of the white-collar initiative [in the late 1970s and early 1980s] simply expanded 
punitive responses to members of the lower middle and middle classes.”); Tony G. Poveda, White-Collar 
Crime and the Justice Department: The Institutionalization of a Concept, 17 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE
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 ITSA did not impose liability on  “control persons”, and when ITSFEA did, it imposed a “knowing or 
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139 See S. Hrg. 100-76, at 19 (list of cases).  In addition, the lengthy, high-profile investigation of Drexel 
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Drexel.  JAMES, supra note 115, at 349, 418.
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 Pitt & Shapiro, supra note --. In defense of the small dollar program, the  SEC argued that enforcement 
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and Shapiro suggest that the SEC actively sought out insider trading cases because they went over well 
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level officers would lack the requisite scienter to be vicariously liable for insider trading 
by their employees.141
Unsurprisingly, the insider trading hearings do not contain explicit reference to 
resentment of the rich.  While politicians may have employed pure anti-capitalist 
populism at other times in history,142 that has not been a viable strategy since at least the 
dawn of the Cold War.  Government’s symbiotic relationship with capitalism and wealth 
meant it could not attack the wealthy per se.  And in the insider trading hearings, 
Congress did not.  It reserved its moral critique for “new money”: young, newly wealthy 
individuals, whom legislators and witnesses accused of lacking discipline and ethics.  The 
hearings thus reflected populist resentment against those who quickly obtained wealth
and then acted in an unseemly way.   The hearings did not challenge the established order 
under which certain individuals and institutions traditionally controlled wealth quietly.  
Indeed, members of the Wall Street establishment joined in the condemnation of “new 
money.”  
Popular culture in the 1980s was fascinated with the “yuppies” who rose from 
obscurity to make immense, rapid fortunes in the financial markets; it also delighted in 
the eventual downfall of some of them.143  In this context, it is worth considering 
Schroeder’s argument that “misappropriation” theory is based on envy of individuals’ 
141
 Pitt & Shapiro, supra note --.  Although ITSFEA imposed liability on “control persons” of insider
traders, it did so only for control persons who acted “knowing[ly] or reckless[ly].”
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 Mark Roe, for example, traces suspicion of concentrated financial power to the Jacksonian era.  More 
recently, radical labor and the Socialist Party were significant political forces in the early 20th century.
143 See, e.g., Stephen Koepp, From Pinstripes to Prison Stripes, TIME, March 2, 1987 
[http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,146057,00.html] (referring to insider trader Martin 
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LEGISLATION AND LEGITIMATION
49
good fortune (however isolated or fleeting), as distinct from a more systematic 
resentment towards the wealthy as a class.144  There is some anecdotal reflection of this 
cultural trope in the hearings.  Legislators and witnesses show particular disdain for those 
who gain wealth quickly at a relatively young age.  They identify this new wealth with 
corruption and imply that traditional economic elites have superior moral sense. This 
suggests that envy of wealth is particularly intense with respect to “new money.”  It is 
also consistent with Fischel’s argument that the charge against insider trading and hostile 
takeovers was driven (or at least cheered on) by the Wall Street establishment.  
Senator D’Amato asserted, “The new players in the market have come into a go-
go environment. It appears to them that success is measured in the amount you earn—the 
ends always justifying the means.”145  Representative Luken (D-Ohio) suggested that the 
1980s saw new kinds of players committing insider trading: “a 23-year old stock broker 
or a 27-year-old lawyer, rather than a CEO…the young resourceful people.”146
Representative Wirth (D-Colo.) asserted that “a number of people, especially young 
people” have been “moving in and taking advantage of” the bull market.147  He found it 
“especially disturbing…that a 33-year old alleged whiz kid earning over $1 million a year 
believed he had to steal another $12 million.  It is equally disturbing to see five young 
men in their twenties using stolen information to line their own pockets….”148 Wirth was 
apparently referring to Dennis Levine and the so-called “Yuppie Five,” respectively.149
144
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Some legislators specifically argued that the Wall Street establishment had moral 
standards superior to those of the new financial players.  Luken stated that “[t]he 
traditional image of the conservative staid, sometimes stony investment banker, has been 
replaced by the young, sharp, highly paid MBA who may not have been exposed to the 
business ethics or traditions of the past.”150  Similarly, D’Amato called on the securities 
industry and corporate law firms to “imbue some sense of morality and ethics into their 
young executives and associates….It appears to them that success is measured in the 
amount you earn—the ends always justifying the means.”151  Testifying before the senate 
Banking Committee, Giuliani cited the “Yuppie Five” defendants as evidence of a failure 
to teach ethics to young people.152  George Ball, Chair and CEO of Prudential-Bache 
Securities, was even more explicit in his defense of the status quo, stating, “[t]hose 26-
year-olds just have not been around long enough” to appreciate “what they owed [sic] to 
the preservation of the integrity of that system.”153  Thus while the attack on insider 
trading may appear to have challenged Wall Street, in fact it can be seen as a defense of 
the established economic order and a rebuke to “newcomers,” who are portrayed as 
threatening to jeopardize the status quo by overreaching.  This rhetorical approach casts 
insider traders as disruptive newcomers and outsiders to an orderly and  virtuous 
establishment—hardly a populist position.
4.  Penalties and Enforcement
guilty to insider trading charges in 1986.  See Reuters, Guilty Plea in “Yuppie 5” Case, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
27, 1986 at C3.
150 H.R. Ser. No. 99-179 at 7.
151 S. Hrg. 100-83 at 5-6. 
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Congress insisted that insider trading activity was rampant, and characterized it as 
a law-enforcement matter.  Congress thus reduced America’s complex economic 
problems to a simplified cops-and-robbers issue.  Like the criticism of “new wealth,” 
transforming inchoate economic dissatisfaction into a law-enforcement problem also had 
an obvious moralistic component.  Focusing on insider trading and portraying it as a law-
enforcement issue was useful in that it reframed economic policy as an issue of punishing 
individual lawbreakers.  This transformed a complex set of issues into a simple morality 
play with an ostensibly simple solution.  It also diverted attention away from more 
intractable economic problems, and thereby blunted fundamental questions about the 
self-regulatory securities law regime and the market-based economic system generally.  
Furthermore, when insider trading is characterized as a law-enforcement issue, it 
is ostensibly amenable to solution by relatively simple legislative means—increased 
enforcement and stricter penalties.  This is not true of more complex economic issues like 
hostile takeovers or America’s loss of global industrial competitiveness.  Nor is it true of 
more complex depictions of insider trading.  That is, insider trading is not necessarily a 
law-enforcement issue.  It may be viewed as a matter of imperfections in the flow of 
information to the markets, or the law’s failure to clearly define permissible and 
impermissible trading activity.  But legislative solutions to those kinds of problems are 
much more difficult, both technically and politically.  Congress failed to pass a definition 
of “insider trading” (and to this day still has not done so).  Instead, it left it to the courts 
to the define the offense on a painfully slow, case-by-case basis. 
As noted above, insider trading regulation was justified in part by the supposed 
need to restore investor confidence.  A policy emphasis on penalties and enforcement can 
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create excessive investor confidence, however.  As Donald Langevoort has argued, anti-
fraud regulation is itself potentially “fraudulent” in that it suggests that enforcement 
protects the public from investment risk.154  Penalties and enforcement do not necessarily 
reduce the incidence of fraud.  Moreover, they cannot eliminate it, so some risk of fraud 
must be accepted as an inevitable agency cost of investing 155  Moreover, even assuming 
that enforcement reduces fraud, investors are constantly exposed to other, more 
significant, forms of risk—most obviously, the risk of market downturns.  Portfolio 
diversification has far more power than anti-fraud measures to mitigate exposure to fraud 
or any other risk.  Indeed, diversification can reduce risk even if the root causes of risk 
(including but not limited to fraud) go unaddressed.  The regulatory regime, however, 
makes no attempt to educate investors about these basic points.  Indeed its focus on 
financial disclosure and anti-fraud enforcement can obscure these points.  As Langevoort 
points out, a passive diversification philosophy conflicts with our faith in the efforts of 
active individual investors and investment advisers.  And, more importantly in the current 
context, it also undermines the perception that legislators and regulators can protect 
investors and are necessary to do so.
ITSFEA created a private cause of action for those who trade contemporaneously 
with an insider trader.  This cause of action, codified as section 20A of the 1934 Act, 
does little to increase the overall exposure of insider traders, however.  A defendant’s 
total liability exposure under section 20A is limited to his profit gained or loss avoided, 
and reduced by any disgorgement.  There is little incentive to bring suit, as the total 
154 Langevoort, supra note ---.
155 Cf. William Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002) 
(“The disturbing thing [about the Enron disaster] is that the standing army of civil and criminal enforcers 
had no deterrent effect.”).
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potential recovery is small, to say nothing of the recovery for any individual plaintiff, 
given the potential number of contemporaneous traders of a publicly traded stock.  
Section 20A does not create a new class of prohibited conduct, and courts have 
interpreted it narrowly.156  The subcommittee draft of ITSFEA had included a provision 
authorizing an additional private right of action for any person (not just contemporaneous 
traders) injured by the acts of an insider trader.157  This provision was deleted in 
committee deliberations, however, due to fear that it would expand civil liability.158
Remarkably, while focusing on penalties, Congress failed to define the offense it 
was punishing.  The federal securities acts have never defined the offense known as 
“insider trading.”  Indeed, federal law has no general rule against trading on nonpublic 
information.  The offense has been constructed by federal court opinions under the 
generic antifraud prohibitions of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated thereunder. The judicial definition was (and remains) notoriously murky.  
While it seems logically necessary that a definition of the offense should proceed a 
discussion of the penalties it entails, the definitional issue proved too technically and 
politically difficult.  Congress nonetheless pushed ahead with the politically easier task of 
increasing maximum penalties. Increasing maximum penalties presented a tough face to 
the public, while passing actual responsibility for action from Congress to the courts, the 
SEC and the Justice Department.
The Congressional focus on penalties is typical of its symbolic, theatrical 
approach to the insider trading issue.  Despite lip service to its effect on “investor 
156
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confidence,” Congress framed insider trading as an issue of immorality and 
punishment—of good versus evil.  It could just as well have been framed as, for example, 
a failure of preventive measures (such as market surveillance or the 13(d) window), or 
even as a type of conduct that is problematic, but marginal.  The hearings assume that 
additional deterrence is needed, but there is no attempt to calculate the deterrent value of 
any specific penalty amounts or structures.  Indeed, the deterrent effect of penalties is 
unavoidably speculative, as we can never know for certain how much crime does not
occur due to penalty laws.  As Dan Kahan has argued:
We will rarely have reliable information on the probability of conviction, 
average psychic gains, elasticity of demand, and like variables, the 
measurement of which depends on seemingly intractable empirical problems.  
Our confidence in the information we do have on these facts will nearly 
always be less than the confidence we have in the relative expressive 
reprehensibility of diverse wrongs…. Consequently,…the raw expressive 
judgments that inform our consequentialist theory of value are much more 
likely to dominate the cost-benefit axioms of deterrence than vice-versa.159
Legislators’ focus on penalties is more plausibly explained as an attempt to 
express outrage at insider trading, which serves the legitimacy purposes explained above.  
Indeed, the very focus on insider trading as a significant economic issue itself makes the 
economic dislocations of the 1980s amenable to reframing as issues of identifiable 
villains, rather than as inevitable consequences of capitalism and the business cycle.  This
is symbolized by the 1987 Senate hearings in which Lynch and Giuliani, the victorious 
enforcement agents of the Boesky and Levine cases, were the only witnesses.  Even 
assuming that insider trading was an issue important enough to merit yet another hearing, 
the choice of witnesses is telling.  The hearings served little purpose other than to frame 
159
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the insider trading issue as a law enforcement struggle and, moreover, to associate 
senators with Lynch and Giuliani, the actual participants in that struggle.160
The point here is not to critique ITSA and ITSFEA’s efficacy in addressing 
insider trading.  Rather, the point is that they do not even seem genuinely intended to 
address insider trading so much as to create the impression of addressing it while 
avoiding politically difficult action.  The emphasis on law enforcement and penalties had 
great rhetorical power in that it reframed vague economic anxieties as narrowly focused 
conflicts with identifiable human villains.  Furthermore, the law-enforcement approach 
relieved Congress of immediate responsibility for solving economic problems and passed 
it on to the agencies.  This strategy resulted in the odd phenomenon of Congress insisting 
that there was an insider trading epidemic, and offering the SEC more power and
resources to combat it, while the SEC insisted that there was no significant problem, that 
it did not need additional powers, and that it did not need additional funding.
a. The Failure to Define “Insider Trading”
In two major cases in the early 1980s, the Supreme Court handed victories to 
defendants, holding that a judge-made definition of insider trading based on § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 had to be a narrow one that satisfied the common-law definition of fraud.161
The Supreme Court decisions invited Congress to clarify the definition of the offense, but 
Congress failed to do so.  Indeed, the fundamental ambiguity of “insider trading” may 
160
 Admittedly, Giuliani at one point offered some plausible anecdotal evidence that penalties work as a 
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have been one of the reasons Congress chose it as its proxy for the economic fears of the 
1980s.  When Congress faces conflicting demands from different interest groups, it may 
prefer legislative ambiguity, leaving interpretation to the courts or administrative 
agencies.162 This may be a form of compromise to defuse disagreement and allow the 
passage of legislation.  It also allows individual legislators to avoid displeasing one of the 
conflicting interest groups:  “…the legislator will be able to assure each group that it 
won, and then will be able to blame a court or agency if subsequent developments belie 
that assurance.”163 As with the increase in maximum penalties, the appeal of  “passing 
the buck” may help explain the failure to adopt a definition.  
The issue of definition came up in the ITSA hearings, but Shad declined to 
discuss the definition or other matters regarding insider trading regulation generally.  He 
said the bill submitted by the SEC was “very specifically addressed to the treble damage 
proposal.”164  In a written memo accompanying his testimony, Shad stated that the SEC 
opposed a definition because the case law was sufficiently clear and a new legislative
definition would just create more grounds for litigation.165  Shad showed more interest in 
exempting certain kinds of conduct than in creating a broad prohibition:166 the SEC
“urge[s] that the legislative history of the bill cite behavior to which the statute is not 
intended to apply.”167  Shad was particularly concerned that an executive who reveals 
162 See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of 
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L.  REV. 627 (2002).  
163
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information to outsiders “in order to obtain their advice and assistance for the benefit of 
his shareholders” not be considered an unlawful “tipper.”168
When ITSA went before the Senate in 1984, Senator D’Amato introduced a 
competing bill that included ITSA’s trebling provision, but would also have outlawed all 
trading on material nonpublic information.169   Shad took no position on D’Amato’s bill, 
stating that the Commission needed time to look at it and compare it to existing law.170
SEC Chief of Enforcement John Fedders was equivocal, presenting six reasons in favor 
of a legislative definition of IT and six reasons against.
D’Amato’s broad definition was in direct response to the Supreme Court’s 1980 
opinion in United States v. Chiarella.  In the absence of a legislative definition of “insider 
trading,” the SEC and the Justice Department typically pursue the offense under the 
generic anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.  In 
Chiarella, a financial printer obtained the names of impending takeover targets by 
reading takeover announcements during the printing process, before their public 
dissemination.  The government argued that a person who trades in securities without
disclosing that fact that he possessed material nonpublic information has committed 
securities fraud.  The Court rejected that argument, however, holding that such a trade 
does not constitute fraud unless the trader had some independent legal duty to disclose, 
such as a fiduciary duty to the counterparty.171  This suggested that while existing law 
prohibited insider trading by corporate insiders (such as officers and directors), who owe 
168
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fiduciary duty to their shareholders, it did not reach trading by most “outsiders” who 
possess material nonpublic information.  Justices Burger and Stevens believed 
“outsiders” commit fraud in violation of 10(b) and 10b-5 if they “misappropriate” 
material nonpublic information, but the majority of the Court did not address this theory, 
as it had not been presented to the jury below.
The committee report accompanying ITSA defended the failure to define insider 
trading.  According to the report, an explicit definition would be too narrow and create 
loopholes.  Furthermore, existing case law was sufficiently clear.172  The report supported 
this latter contention with reference to cases predating Chiarella, but remarkably failed to 
mention Chiarella.173
In summer 1987, in reaction to the wave of insider trading scandals, Congress 
again considered a legislative definition of insider trading: S. 1380, the Insider Trading 
Proscriptions Act (ITPA).174  Once again, Senator D’Amato was the primary sponsor of 
the bill.  It would have prohibited the use of information that had been “used or obtained 
wrongfully” to trade in securities.  Like the 1984 proposal, the proposed definition was 
independent of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but it was narrower than the earlier proposal.  The 
ITPA definition was specifically constructed to codify the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading liability.175  That theory was indirectly implicated in Carpenter v. U.S., 
172 See H. REP. 98-355, 98th Cong. 2d sess., at 13-14 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286-
87.  
173
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which was pending before the Supreme Court in 1987.176 Carpenter involved charges 
under mail fraud, not 10b-5, but turned on the idea that the misuse of information for 
trading purposes constituted fraud.  
The Chair of the House Energy & Commerce Committee, John Dingell, opposed 
ITPA on the ground that a clear proscription would be easier to evade.177  The SEC, 
under David Ruder’s chairmanship, proposed its own, substantially similar, version of 
ITPA in November 1987.178  The perceived need for ITPA soon abated, however,  when 
the Supreme Court decided Carpenter late in 1987.179  The Court upheld the defendants’ 
convictions on mail fraud charges and contained no language undermining the 
misappropriation theory.180  ITPA ultimately failed to pass, and ITSFEA, introduced in 
June 1988, contained no definition.
b. The SEC’s Restrained Approach to Penalties
Although the SEC drafted the ITSA legislation, Commission officials gave only 
lukewarm support to increased penalties.  Before ITSA, the only civil sanction for insider 
176
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trading was disgorgement of trading profits.  At the ITSA hearings, Shad stated that he 
wanted the hearings to inform the public that under existing law, insider traders faced a 
“host of other sanctions” in  addition to disgorgement, including loss of broker-dealer 
licenses and criminal sanctions, as well as non-legal sanctions, such as “loss of 
employment, social opprobria [sic], [and] heavy legal fees.”181 SEC counsel Dan Goelzer 
was wary of increasing civil penalties too much, for fear this “might change the character 
of the Commission’s enforcement program, inhibit settlements of the Commission’s 
enforcement actions and cause the judiciary to be less receptive to Commission actions 
designed to protect the investing public.”182  Goelzer took the position that in the 
secondary liability context, the trebling provision should apply narrowly: an employer 
should face treble damages only if liable for aiding and abetting, and not merely on the 
basis of respondeat superior.183  Shad took an even narrower position, stating that the 
SEC’s recommendation was that trebling should apply only to persons who “actually 
trade while in possession of material nonpublic information or who tip such information 
to others who trade.” 184  “Employers, control persons, and aiders and abettors (other than 
tippers)” should not be subject to treble damages under the statute, Shad argued.185
Predictably, issuers, corporate lawyers, and securities firms also favored narrowing 
secondary liability.186
181
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Later, in December 1986 hearings following the Levine and Boesky settlements, 
Dingell argued that the treble-penalty provision of ITSA was an insufficient deterrent.  
Larger penalties might be necessary, he argued, due to the “unbelievable greed of some in 
the marketplace.”187 Representative Luken pointed out that ITSA penalties only work as a 
deterrent if they are really being applied. 188  Between the passage of ITSA in 1984 and 
summer 1986, the SEC brought 11 cases. It obtained civil penalties in 9 of them, all 
pursuant to settlements.  According to Shad, “most of the defendants” in these cases were 
required to disgorge their profits and pay a penalty equal to the amount of profit.189 In 
the largest and most notorious insider trading case, Dennis Levine’s settlement involved 
no penalty, requiring only disgorgement of $11 million in profits and cooperation in 
further investigation, which ultimately yielded little.  One defendant, First Boston 
Corporation, paid a penalty equal to twice the amount of profit.  No defendant paid the 
treble penalty authorized by ITSA.190
William J. Anderson, the GAO’s Assistant Comptroller General for General 
Government Programs, testified that as of Sept. 30, 1986, the full treble damages 
permitted under ITSA had never been imposed in any case.191   In fiscal 1985, penalties 
in excess of disgorgement were imposed in only 2 of 12 civil actions.  The penalties 
imposed were less than the profits disgorged.  Penalties were imposed in 15 of 30 actions 
in 1986.  Penalties in those cases ranged from .01 times profits to 2.36 times profits.  As a 
partial explanation, the SEC told GAO that it considers a defendant’s ability to pay when 
187
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requesting penalties.192  Shad proudly testified that in calendar 1986 as of December 11, 
SEC civil cases had obtained court orders for $80 million in disgorgements and $54 
million in penalties193—note, however, that this aggregate penalty amount is far less than 
the maximum permitted under the treble damages provision.
After ITSA, Shad did not believe any further insider trading sanctions were 
necessary.  He argued that “ITSA, by supplementing other civil, administrative and 
criminal sanctions, provides substantial deterrence of insider trading.”194   Of course, 
such a contention is non-falsifiable.  Shad also argued that the major cases like Levine 
and Boesky had triggered a number of SEC investigations into related activity, and it 
would be “premature” to consider additional insider trading laws while those 
investigations were in progress.195
Shad and his SEC showed no interest in severe punishment of insider trading. 
Both the Levine and Boesky settlements were criticized at the time as weak.196  Dennis 
Levine was arrested in May 1986. and in early June, he pleaded guilty to four felonies.  
Levine settled SEC civil charges by agreeing to disgorge $11.6 million in trading profits, 
a permanent injunction from future securities law violations and a lifetime ban from the 
securities industry.197  In the July 1986 hearings, legislators asked Shad why Levine did 
not pay any civil penalties under ITSA.  At least some of Levine’s trading occurred 
before the effective date of ITSA, but Shad did not rely on that fact.  Rather, he explained 
by stating that Levine “disgorged $11.6 million and agreed to cooperate in the 
192 Id. at 33.
193 Id. at 54.
194 Id. at 63
195 Id. at 53.
196 See, e.g., JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 295-96 (1991).
197
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Commission’s continuing investigation.  He also simultaneously pled guilty to four 
felony counts.” 198  The Justice Department, which cooperated extensively with the SEC 
in the Levine investigation, was no more severe.  In 1986, Shad told Congress that the 
maximum penalties Levine faced were 20 years in prison and $610,000 in fines.199 But 
when Levine was finally sentenced, he received only 2 years and $362,000 in fines.200
Luken argued that the practice of giving leniency in exchange for testifying against others 
undermined the deterrent effect of sanctions.201
Gary Lynch, the SEC’s head of enforcement, testified that Boesky’s $100 million
settlement consisted of a $50 million disgorgement and a $50 million penalty—again, far 
less than the maximum treble damages.  (Boesky also agreed to plead guilty to criminal 
charges, resulting in a three-year jail sentence.202)  Part of Boesky’s settlement with the
SEC and federal prosecutors barred Boesky from association with  a broker-dealer—but 
the bar was stayed “to permit an orderly transfer of control of Boesky’s current 
businesses.”203  Moreover, the government promised to withhold the announcement of 
the settlement so that Boesky could quietly liquidate his positions before their prices 
crashed.  In effect, the government’s settlement terms enabled him to avoid enormous 
losses by trading on material nonpublic information—the news of his own guilty plea and 
settlement.  In response to that issue, Shad pointed out that the SEC did not want to roil 
the markets.  He also invoked the Supreme Court’s narrow definition of insider trading: 
198 Id.; see also HR Hrg 99-179 at 88 (Lynch testimony).
199
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although Boesky had nonpublic information, his trading was not illegal because he 
violated no duty of disclosure, and thus did not violate Rule 10b-5.204
Later in the same hearing, Luken questioned whether Boesky’s fine would really 
have a deterrent effect.  He asked whether the SEC had investigated Boesky’s assets and 
ability to pay before setting the penalty at $50 million.  Lynch evaded the question for a 
while, but Luken finally demanded a response.  Lynch appeared to concede that he had 
not performed such an investigation: “It was our judgment that we ought to settle the 
matter and get on about our business, [get] him as a cooperating witness and try to clean 
up some of the abuses.”205
John Shad had been succeeded by David Ruder by the time Congress considered 
ITSFEA.  Ruder did not initially support most of  ITSFEA.  His testimony in July 1988 
was critical of the legislation.  He was ambivalent about extending ITSA’s trebling 
provision to “control persons” of insider traders because he believed that “[e]xisting 
incentives in this area are already substantial.”206  He also noted that the SEC had already 
approved New York Stock Exchange rule changes increasing supervisory requirements in 
member firms.207  He stated that this SRO-based approach was “more comprehensive” 
and thus “more desirable” than ITSFEA’s imposition of control-person liability.208
204 Id. at 124.  
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Ruder also expressed concern that ITSFEA’s private cause of action for 
contemporaneous traders might place excessive liability on defendants, since exposure 
would derive from arbitrary factors like trading volume.209  At the time of the hearing, the
committee print of the bill placed no cap on total damages in a private action.  Ruder 
argued that this uncapped liability was potentially “Draconian.”210  Ruder also argued 
that ITSFEA’s proposed increase in criminal monetary penalties was unnecessary, and
that the existing five-year maximum jail term was the most important criminal penalty 
(ITSFEA increased the maximum to ten years).211  When pressed on his views on the 
bounty provision, Ruder said he had “always been troubled by the bounty concept” 
because he opposed paying people “for doing what they already should be doing.”212
Ruder did support section 6, which authorized SEC to conduct investigations in 
response to a foreign government’s request for assistance in investigating violations of 
that country’s securities laws.213  Ruder thought this was the most important part 
ITSFEA, because it would help foreign prosecutions and encourage foreign governments 
to cooperate with the SEC.  Dennis Levine, for example, had done his insider trading 
through an offshore account, and his scheme was discovered thanks to tips from abroad.
Ruder also supported ITPA, the proposed definition of insider trading, which ultimately 
failed.214  He submitted his unenthusiastic written comments on ITSFEA into the record 
and then invited discussion on other proposed reforms.215
209
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213 Id. at 47-49.  
214 Id. at 50.  Indeed, in the ITSFEA hearings, Ruder was more interested in ITPA and other reforms than in 
discussing ITSFEA.  
215 Id. at 21.
LEGISLATION AND LEGITIMATION
66
Other than capping liability in private suits,  Congress did not respond to Ruder’s 
criticisms of ITSFEA.  Ruder suddenly changed his position on the bill just before it was 
passed.  When asked about his view of the bill in September 1988, he said “I personally 
support the bill.”  Despite his earlier insistence that increased penalties were unnecessary, 
he stated, “I think that increases in sanctions in the insider trading area will be helpful 
and effective in deterring that kind of conduct.”216  It is unclear what prompted Ruder’s 
change in position.  Despite his late support, however, note that Congress drafted most 
provisions of the bill, including its increase in SEC discretion with respect to “control 
person” penalties, despite Ruder’s opposition. 
c. Enforcement Resources
Shad initially opposed Congressional plans to expand the SEC’s budget, 
particularly in the enforcement area. 217 He insisted that the SEC could perform its 
enforcement mission without larger budgets.  In the Senate hearings on ITSA, Proxmire 
asked Shad why he did not seek additional appropriations for enforcement.218  Shad 
responded by stating that the Enforcement Division had brought an increased number of 
cases in fiscal 1982, despite a reduction in staff, and another increase in 1983 despite no 
growth in staff.219  Shad acknowledged that there was always the possibility of 
undetected violations that could be prosecuted with more resources, but he expressed less 
concern about under-enforcement than about cost-benefit analysis in an era of budget 
216 Id. at 264.
217
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deficits. He also stated, as he had in the House hearings, that no law enforcement agency 
can ever know how many violations are going undetected.220
In 1985, when the SEC requested authorizations before the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, SEC representatives mentioned ITSA in passing as an achievement to be 
proud of, but did not mention insider trading enforcement as a justification for its 
budget.221  In accordance with the Reagan budget, Shad did not ask Congress for 
increases in SEC funding.222  Shad’s testimony focused on the recent failures of 
government securities dealers, raising questions about whether closer regulation was 
needed, and also on the pending deregulation of financial services that would increase the 
number of institutions subject to SEC regulation.223 Senators Alan Cranston (C-Calif.), 
Sasser, and Proxmire, however, showed great interest in enforcement actions, however, 
asking Shad whether the SEC was being aggressive enough.224  Proxmire asked why
Shad was not asking for more money for enforcement.  Shad replied that Reagan’s 1986 
budget was sufficient.225
This seems to belie the conventional wisdom that Democrats favor “regulatory”
approaches to securities law while Republicans favor deregulation and stiffer 
enforcement of the most egregious conduct.  Rather, agency chief Shad (a Republican) 
seems more interested in regulation while these politicians (all Democrats) seem more 
interested in enforcement.  This makes sense, as enforcement is much easier for 
220 Id. at 65.
221
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politicians to understand, and makes a more dramatic statement to the public about the 
government’s commitment to imposing discipline on the markets.  
d. Legislative Expansion of Executive Discretion 
Even assuming that increased penalties were an appropriate response to an insider 
trading “epidemic,”  the increase in penalties under ITSA and ITSFEA was more 
apparent than real.  The treble-damages provision of ITSA did not include any mandatory 
increases in penalties. Rather, it only increased the maximum civil sanction, authorizing 
courts to award up to three times profits as a penalty.  ITSFEA expanded this discretion 
to the control person context.  Similarly, ITSA and ITSFEA sequentially raised maximum 
criminal fines, but not minima.  The Committee Report on ITSFEA stated that “courts 
should impose jail terms” for insider trading, and that it “expects that raising the ceiling 
will increase the certainty of substantial prison sentences,”226 but in fact ITSFEA did 
nothing to require jail time.  Similarly, as Shad himself pointed out to Congress, “ITSA 
does not require that a civil penalty be imposed in every case, nor does it provide specific 
criteria to be used in determining the amount of the penalty to be imposed…The 
determination of those facts and circumstances which justify imposing the maximum 
penalty will ultimately be made by the judiciary as precedents are established.”227
Increasing the range of penalties does not directly increase penalties imposed on 
wrongdoers; it only increases the discretion of the enforcement agencies that recommend 
sanctions and the courts that impose them. 
226 H. REP. 910, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at – (emphasis added).
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ITSA and  ITSFEA further expanded executive power by giving the SEC 
discretion to exempt “any person or transaction or class of persons or transactions” from 
their penalty provisions.228  Neither the ITSA nor ITSFEA hearings include consideration 
of mandatory minimum penalties or other restrictions on SEC discretion.  Furthermore, 
the failure to pass a legislative definition put the definition of insider trading in the hands 
of SEC rulemaking and the charging decisions of SEC civil enforcers and Justice 
Department prosecutors (subject, of course, to judicial review).
The fact that Congress “reformed” insider trading law by expanding the discretion 
of executive agencies is remarkable in light of the clear difference in philosophy between 
the Democratically-controlled Congress and the Republican Administration.  Congress 
and the SEC sharply disagreed about the scope of the insider trading problem, the 
appropriateness of harsher penalties and the need for more enforcement resources.  This 
was not a matter of political compromise, in which Congress ceded discretion to a 
powerful executive.  Rather, it was a matter of buck-passing, for ITSA and ITSFEA both 
gave the SEC power it did not seem to want.
As noted above, the trebling provision of ITSA had never been applied as of 
1986.  Furthermore, the SEC gave only grudging support to ITSA, the Commission’s 
own bill, and refused to support ITSFEA until the eleventh hour.  After ITSA, the SEC 
did not seek any further discretion in penalty matters.  In 1985 hearings, Senator 
Proxmire asked Shad whether the SEC should be given increased power to set civil fines.  
Shad said it was not necessary, because ITSA was sufficient.229  He repeated the caution 
expressed in the ITSA hearings—that high penalties might reduce judicial willingness to 
228
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go along with SEC penalties, might increase defendants’ willingness to litigate, and that 
the SEC needed time to see whether ITSA was working.230  Despite all this, Congress 
followed ITSA with ITSFEA, extending treble penalties, and the concomitant executive 
discretion, to the control-person context.  Congress’s continued failure to define the 
offense put the direction of the “war” on insider trading even further out of Congressional 
control and more squarely in the hands of the SEC, the Justice Department, and the 
courts.  As noted above, Congress praised Shad and his SEC for their enforcement efforts 
even as Shad and other Commission officials testified that insider trading was not a 
significant problem.  Indeed, Congress seemed to protest too much when it included in 
ITSFEA’s preamble a statement that the SEC had been enforcing the existing rules 
against insider trading “vigorously, effectively, and fairly.”231  Congress did not call 
attention to Shad’s lukewarm attitude toward insider trading enforcement: if it were to do 
so, it could not justify “passing the buck” to the SEC.  
V. CONCLUSION
Most current legal commentary on corporate and securities regulation (such as the 
wealth of excellent work on Sarbanes-Oxley), focuses on whether a regulatory approach
succeeded, or will succeed, in improving economic welfare (however that may be 
defined).   The focus of this article is very different.  Focusing on the front end rather 
than the back, it is not concerned with the economic effects that securities regulation
produces, but with the political motivations that produce it.  This inquiry suggests that 
230 Id. at 73-74; 90-92.  The SEC did, however, want authority to bring administrative proceedings under 





economic regulation is the product of Congress’s concern for its own perpetuation as an 
institution and not the result of its sober calculations of economic effects.
Lawmaking is a process as well as a product.  Legal commentators tend to focus 
on the product.  Legal scholarship’s traditional bias toward judge-made law over 
legislation exacerbates this tendency, since the process of writing judicial opinions is 
largely inaccessible to scholars.  Legislators, speaking and writing for the record, are 
literally performing to communicate to their colleagues, for the edification of society, and 
to the voters.  While much has been written on the “expressive” function of law, this 
commentary tends to view law as the expression of public values.  But this view 
necessarily presumes that the legislators (or judges) who make the law are a frictionless 
conduit of public values.   More skeptical views of lawmaking see legislators as bought-
and-paid-for conduits not of the public interest, but of “special interests.”   Those (such as 
Richard Fenno) who do consider the autonomy of legislators tend focus on them as 
classical rational actors seeking individual gain.  I suggest that legislators may use their 
autonomy to legitimate the existing political and economic order.  While this theory is 
consistent with a characterization of politicians as cynical lackeys of capitalism, it is just 
as consistent with legislators who are sincere believers in the American establishment.
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